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I. INTRODUC'TION

Law firms have historically been organized as partnerships. For many years, the
traditional law partnership model assumed that partners wou ld remain partners until
their retirement or untimely death; their tirms were faithful to them over their career
course.' If partnership was not equivalent to academic tenure. it was fairly close.
Such security is no longer the rule. For lawyers practicing in large law firms.
remaining a partner has joined becoming a partner as a career aspiration. 2
In 2007, the AmLaw l 00-the nation 's top-grossing law firms- completed a
five-year economic surge so prosperous that it was touted by the legal media as the
"Law Firm Golden Age." 3 Yet in this time of incredible bounty, thirty-seven of the
nation's richest law firms reduced their equity partncrsh ips. 4 In some cases they
expelled partners outright and in others they "de-equitized'' them. " De-cquitization.''
of course, refers to the demotion of partners from equity status, where they share in
finn profits, to non-equity status, where they do not share in profits and are instead
compensated via guaranteed payments out of firm profits that resemble a salary.'
·senior Vice President, Global Profession Practice. Aon Risk Services. Chicago. Illinois.
J. D., University of Kansas; M.Ed., University of Nebraska: B.S., Fort Hays State Uni versity.
Opinions expressed here are the author's alone.
'Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr .. The Underlying Causes of Withdrawal a11d Expulsion t?(
Partners from Law Firms, 55 WASH. & LEI:: L. REV. 1073. 1073 ( 1998).
2

Nathan Koppel, Par!nership Is No Longer a Tenured
iliun Pos
Ranks of Partners to Boost Profits. Allract. Keep High Earners.

- More Luw Firms 1'l1in
ST. .1 ., July 6, 2007, at

WALL

81.
3Aric

Press & John o·connor. Lessons f?{the Am Law 100, AM. LAW.. May 2008. at 131.

4/d.
5Gencrally speaking, firms also return to de-equiti:.-.ed partners any capital they contributed
to the firm in connection with their equity partnership.
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Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009

1

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

94

[Vol. 57:93

Consider, for example, Chicago's venerable Mayer Brown, which reported 2007
profits per partner of $1.24 million, up from S 1.1 2 million in 2006. 1' In early 2007,
Mayer Brown either expelled outright or de-equitized forty-five partners as a result
of its leaders ' concern that its profits per partner compared unfavorably to those of
its competitors. " We want to drive our stock price up," the fi rm 's incoming
chairman was quoted as saying about the aclion. 7 Although such remarks may seem
callous. they are consistent with current law firm management principles. Numerous
other large law firms have also thinned their equity partnership ranks recently,
whether driven by a desire to increase their profits per partner or because some areas
of their practices have materially s lowed.& Many of these firms appear to outside
observers to be financially robust.
While expulsion plainly is an important remedy for law tinns hampered by
shirking or untrustworthy partners, today many expel led partners do not obviously fit
into either of these categories. Increasingly, former pat1ners allege that their
expulsions were the product not of their poor performance or their firms' economic
plight, but instead were fueled by their firms' corrupt or immoral aspirations or
purposes.<i Expulsion decisions that law firms characterize as valid business
judgments are in some affected partners' eyes naked economic predation. The
problem is not tht:ir under-pcrfom1ance, expelled pat1ners commonly assert, but
former colleagues' avarice and narcissism, and law firm leaders' desire to hoard
wea lth and financially benefit favored colleagues. To some observers, such

''More Firms Enter Seven-Figure Territor_!
'.
AM. LAw., May 200R, at 195. 195 (calculating
2006 profits per partner from 2007 figure and repotted percentage growth).
7

Posting of Ashby Jones to The Wall Street Journal Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/
law/2007/03/02/move-on-the-mayer-brown-departures/ (Mar. 2, 2007) (quoting James
Holzhauer).
8
See.
, Ciling
e.g.
a Soft Economy. Sonnenschein Cuts 37, 30 NAT'!. L.J. 3, 3 (2008)
(repo1ting that a large law fim1 expelled six partners as a result of its slowing real estate and
tinancial practices); Ameet Sachdev. Jenner & Block Law Firm Cws Se veral Partners, CHI.
TRIR., Mar. 6, 2008, Business, at C I (reporting on second round of partner de-equitizations
and expulsions at finn); Koppel. supra note 2, at BI (describing increasingly frequent partner
de-equitization. expulsion and ·'decompression" as tirms attempt to increase profitability);
Lynne Marek, Jenner & Block Takes Some Partners O.flEquif.!' Le vel, 29 NAT'L L.J. 10, 10
(2007) (reporting on law finn de-cquitizing some partners and asking others to leave):
Elizabeth Goldberg, The Departed. AM. LAW.. May 2007, at 145 (identifying several large law
firms orchestrating exits of allegedly under-pcrtonning pann..:rs); Leigh Jones, Downsizing:
Who's Next! After Mayer, Parring Parlllers to up Proj/ts, 29 NAr·L L.J. I. I (2007)
(discussing firms downsizing equity partner ranks); Anthony Lin, Some Pcmners Will get the
Ax at Chadbourne, 28 Nt\r' L L.J. I0. 10 (2006) (reporting firm's intention to expel some
partners given disappointing financial results).

See. e.g.. Lynne Marek, Former {11/c~!'er Brown Partner Sues 0 1·er Ousting
, 30 NAT'L L.J.
I0, I0 (2008) (reporting former partner's allegation that f'irm expelled him in an effort to
inappropriately pursue new business): Brenda Sandburg, Df!we." Fight Continues, 29 Lt:GAt.
TtMF.S 10, 15 (2006) (reporting on expelled partner's suit against his Jonner law linn):
Anthony Lin, Dismissed Parmer Sues Hofland & Knight for Fraud. Age Bias, 236 N.Y. L.J. 1.
I (2006) (discussing expelled partner's lawsuit against his tom1er firm).
9
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rapacious behavior is amply evidenced by firms'de-cquiti'l.ation
expulsion and
of
competent and honest partners during profitable pcriods.''J
Law lirms contemplating partner expulsions
st
mu appreciate the potential for
claims of bad fa ith or other misconduct linked to their actions. 11 Un like te rminatin
g
employees- which in most cases is stra ightlimvard
ing
- cxpc
ll
partne rs can bl.! ·'a
difficult, tricky, and polt'ntially dangerous exen:i!;c... , ~ There is the language of the
partnership agreement to contend \\'ith and, beyond that. the partnership re lation "is a
fiduciary one, a relation of trust''
t ca
est·ha
rri wi th it ·'the requirement of utmost good
eed.
all' Ind
of
possible business relatio nships. partnership c learly
faith and loyalty."L
requires of its parties the highest clt::gree of good fai th.'" At the same time. there arc
thv reported cases on law firm partner expubion
s.
As a practical matter, partners
lly expcl
kd may noncth eles~ opt not to sue their
who believe they were wrongfu
former law firms l()r fear that doing so wi ll diminish their ability to Sl!cure a position
at another finn, impair the ir ability to recoup their capital from their lo nnerfirms ,
harm their reputations, or ruin key relationships. Lawyers who are wise in the ways
of litigation may consider it undesirable to sue their tormer partners because of the
associated time or expense. Firms may ollerattractive severance packages to
partners who agree to resign in lieu of expulsion. or who agree not to challenge their
expulsions.
Many firms include arbitration provisions in their partnership
agreements, meaning that expulsion disputes are resolved pri vate ly,
Some scholars suggest that judicial n:gula tion or law linn partnership expuls ions
is generally unwise or unnecessary because law lirmsveha stro ng incenti ves to avoid
abusing their expulsion powl!r. For example, Professor Larry Ribstcin posits that the
threat of misguided expulsiony '"ma deter partne rs from contributing to their firm 's
reputation rather than their own.''' ~ If partners fear expulsion and thus the
fr
appropriation of their rights in the ir firm ·s reputation. they "wi ll be deteJTI.!dom
contributing to the development of the llrm's reputation. They will instead locus on
their own clients as a kind of job insurance. Thus. abusive cxpuls ion[s j may
discourage actions that help the firm.'" '" As another basis for urging judicial restraint
in this context. he asserts that firms that expel productive partners incur reputational
costs. 17 Such lim1s "send signals not on ly to ot her lawyers in the firm. but a lso to

wSee. e.g., Goldberg. -'"Jim note K at 149 (quoting. a harshly critil:al
r obse ver
Brown's actions).
11See

Paula .1. Dalley, The· Partner
LaH' r!f

£.\lntls11ms:

Fiduciw:c• /)uty

or Moyer

all(./
Faith.
Good

p<H1ner5 generally argue that their expulsion ~
constitute a breach offiduciary duty and oi' good laith.").
2 1 CARDOZO L R t:V , 1RI, I tG ( 19()9) (""E,xp..:lled
1

~Robert

FOROIIAM L
13

W. Hillman. The: /mpacl
'rship o(' l'urill<
Rr:v. 393, 396 ( 1998).

La11·

011

the Legal Pn1ji!ssion, (>7

0ella Ratta v. Larkin, 856 A.2d 643, 65X (Md. 2004)

Lach v . Man o·war. L.LC.. 256 S.W.3J
569 563.
Keenon, 271 S.W.2d 270.273 (Ky. 1954)).
14See

15 Larry

(Ky. 2(HHl) (citing V an il(>Oscr ' .

E. Ribstt:in. /.mr Portner Exp11fsion. 55 Bt 'S. L\ w. 845, X51 (200 0).

11

'/d. (footnote omitted).

17

/d. at 852.
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potential future hires. to be wary of dealing with the finn. "'~ Finally, Professor
Ribstein reasons, it is unlikely that courts wi ll do a better job than tinns themselves
of determining whether expulsions were justified. 19 In summary, he contends,
" placing judicial constraints on the expulsion power weakens the effectiveness of
this remedy.'' 2c
In fact, nothing about the threat of misguided expulsion induces partners to put
their interests first. Many partners will do that anyway. "Much current practice in
[law] finn governance, organ ization, and (not least) compensation comes from the
fact that partners vigorously defend their rights to autonomy and individualism. well
beyond what is common in other profess ion~.''21 Partners to<.:us on their clients
because of the associated psychic benefits. because firm compensation systems
reward business development, and because controlling business provides opportunity
and security beyond warding on· expu lsion. As lor the risk of reputational injury,
most lawyers think tl!ev will never be cxpdled, meaning that they may not be
skeptical of tirms that prune partners. In addition, expulsions may perwrsely
enhance tirms' reputations. Some firms promote their ''tough-minded approach'' to
handling unproductive partners. 2 ~ "There is much less of a stigma attached to
[expelling partners) than even fivl! years ago ... . More and more, firms realize you
need to send a message to the market that yo u arc a hard-working firm. "D The key
question is whether lawyers are capable of distinguishing wrongful expu lsions at
other firms. If not, firms have little or no associated reputational risk. Finally, as to
courts' questionable competence to adjudicate expulsion disputes, the same
observation can be made with respect to many employment disputes and countless
other controversies that pivot on indirect evidence and parties' subjective
determinations. Yet courts capably resolve such disputes every day. For that matter,
objective observers should be skeptical of the notion that self-interested law firms
are best positioned to weigh the propriety of their allegedly wrongful expulsions.
In any event, in the current law firm climate, it is important to understand the
rules governing partner expulsion. Indeed, as law firm productivity slowed in the
first half of 2008, legal industry consultants began touting as "a silver lining" the fact
that a "bad year" (relatively speaking) would enable firms to take steps that their
partners would usually resist, such as "winnowing out unproductive lawycrs." 24
These consultants clearly envision increas ing numbers of law firms shedding both
equity and non-equity partners to stabilize or enhance profitability.
This at1icle will examine the contours of lirms' expulsion power, beginning in
Part II with a brief discussion of relevant partnership law. Part llf examines the
leading law firm partner expulsion cases and principles disti lled from them. Part IV
addresses two current issues that have so far escaped analysis. First, it considers
~ ~,d.

19/d.
20

Ribstein,
15.
supra nott:

1

at 852.

~ David Maistcr, The Trouble Wirh LauTer.\·. AM.
2

LAW., t\pr.

2006. at 97, 98.

~ KoppeL supra note 2, at 8 I (citing law tirm consultant Peter Zeug hauser).

23

/d. (quoting law tinn consultant Peter Zeughauser).

2

JDan DiPietro, Under Pressure. A :VI. LAw., Oct. 2008, at 79
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whether partner de-equitization constitutes expulsion. Second, it highlights concerns
where fim1s rest t:xpu lsion power in a single decision-maker, such as a managing
partner or chairperson. Finally. Part V examines employment law constraints on law
firms' abil ity to expel or de-equitize partn..;rs in light of the Seventh Circuit's
decision in EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood. 15
II.

PARTNE RSHIP LAW FUNDAMENTALS

Partnership law is in many respects statutory, but somewhat less so insofar as
partner expulsion is concerned. The Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA"), long the
underpinning for state pr~rtnership laws. provides only that expulsion provisions in
partnership agreements are to be given effect.' 6 Of course. partners may generally
tix their rights by agrcement. 1 ~ The subsequt:nt Revised Uniform Partnership Act
("RUPA"), which adopts the entity theory of partnership, perpetuates that scheme
while broadening it son1cwhat. 1F RUPA permits the expulsion of a partner by a
unanimous vote of the other partners in some circumstances, even if the partnership
agreement does not authorize expulsion?) Furthermore, under RUPA, a partnership
may petition a court to ~::·xpel a partner for specitied misconduct regardless of
whether the partnership agreement provides l(>r expu lsion. 30
Thus, in states Hdhcring to the UPA or a variation thereof. a firm's right to expel
a partner "arises, if at aiL from the partnership agrecment."11 Absent an expulsion
provision in the partnership agreement. the UPA effectively provides that a tim1 can
rid itself of a partner only through a dissolution and later reformation without the
partner proposed to be ousted. '~ Attempting to expel a partner in the absence of an
expulsion clause is a breach uf the partnership agreement that entitles the partner to
:;315 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2002 l.

*

26
UN1f. P'sHtP An 31( 1)(d) ( 1914) (recognizing expulsion " from the businc::ss bona fide
in accordance with sut:h a power confen·ed by the agreement between the partners'').

27

Bailey v. Fish & Ncave. l36S N.E.2d 956, 959 (N.Y. 2007 ).

28 ROLIERT

W.

HILl ~·I AN 1.:1 ' A I ..

TilE REVISED

lJN IHlRM PARTNERSHIP

ACT§ 601(3) (2007)

(perpetuating the UPA scheme by recognizing a partner's dissociation f'rom a firm upon "the si•
partner's expul >n pursuant lu the partnership agreement").

*

10

60 1( -1) (perm ill ing expulsion by unanimous vote absent an expulsion clause where it
wou ld be unlawful to carry on business with the subject partner. there has been a qualifying
transfer of the partner's trans terable interest in the partnership, the subject partner is a
corporation that is dissolving or in tend~ to dissoh·c. or a partnership is a partner that is
dissolved and is winding up).
30§

601 (5) (allowing expulsion by judicial determination where subject partner engaged in
wrongful conduct adversely and material ly alfecting rh.:: partnership's business. partner
persistently or willfully committed a material breach or the partnership agreement or of certain
other duties owed to the other partners or to the partnership. 0r panncr's conduct relating lO
the partnership busi ness is suc.:h tha1 it is nnt reasonably practicable ro carry on the partnership
business with him).
3 1Allan W. Vestal
,
Law Partner Expulsions. 55 WAS i l. & Ll'l' L. R EV. 1083. (199g);
1111
uccorcl JcfT Schwam~. Good Faith in Parmer Expulsiom: Application of a Con tract Lmv
Paradigm , 9 CHAP. L. REV. l. 1 (2005) (making. the same point).

'

1

Dawson v. White & C1sc, 6T2 N.E.2d
589,592
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damages. ' ; Even in states that haH: adopted RUPA,
nerships
part
may neatly expel a
partner only ir they prov ide l(>r expulsion in their agreement. The circumstances in
which a lirm can expel a partner by unan imous partnership vote are narrow and rare,
and unanim ity may be diflicult to achieYe. Seek ing a judicial expu lsion is
potentinlly aggravating. cost ly, and time-consuming. Suing to expel a partner is also
likely to generate adn:rsc publicity l()r a finn. Accordingly, most partnership
agreements today con tain t:xpulsion provisions.
There ccrt:1inly an:: situations in which fi rms are legitimately interested in
removing partners. Beeause these situations vary widely. are usua lly fact-s pecific.
and firms must sometimes act expediently to remove disruptive or irresponsible
partners. most law lirm partnersh ip agreements are drafted very broadly. T hey
typically permit expulsion '' ithout cause and do not provide due process protections
or alford the target partn..:r an opportunity to be heard.'~ For example, a partnership
agrc<.:mcnt might provide:
The Partn..:rship shall have:: the right at any time to cause the removal of
any partner. upon making the determ ination that the partner is unable for
any reason to continue as a member of the Partnershi
p
in a proper manner,
or that. lor any reason. such partner's continued membership in the
Partnership is inappropriate.
Such dett:nnination shall require the
alfinnativc vote or 3/4 of a ll of the partners then constituting the
Partn<.:rship. I r such determination shall be made as aforesaid, the removal
of such partner li·om the Partnership shall b<.:come effective immediately
upon the da te of such anirmativc vote.>'

The

The expu ls ion o r a partner without cause or an opportun ity to be heard is commonly
rderred to as the "'gui llo tine approach" 16 or a!> a ..gui llotine severance.''-17
inkrprdation or a partnersh ip agreement is a question of law. 1x Courts
strict ly construe expulsion clauses, a:s E!trlic!t "- JIOJrl'"' illustrates. The plaintiff in
E!trlic!t was a partn<.:r in a New York law li nn. Although he was a partner, Ehrlich's
1
·'

Dalk y.supra
. notc 11. at

IX5

'-'Ifa n expu
provision
l sion
in a partnership agn:emcnt is silent as to cause, a court will not
read a \.'au~c requirement into ir. If th..: Jlro,·ision i nclude$ a cnusc requirement. a court will
strictly enCore..:Vtstal.
it.
supra note 31. at 11 11-12. Courts will not read a due process
req uirement int.1 an expulsion prtn ision when~ it do!!s not othcrwbe exist. See. e.g. , Waite ex
r ef. Bretton Woods /\ctJUI ~ i t inn Co. v. Sylvest.:r. 560 /\.2d 619.
1 622-23 tN.I I. 989); Leigh v.
Crc~c..:nt Square. Ltd .. 60X N.l:.2d
l iM. ( 1161-: Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Holman v. Coie, 522
P.2d 51 5.524 (Wash. Ct. App. 197-l).uire thewhose
linn
'' Cllllidentiality obligations r.:q
clause i' lifkd not b..: identified.
'Ikllcr ''

' . Pillsbul)
Sutro.
Mad ison 8:.

that

from

partnership agreement this

SX Cal. Rptr. 2d 336. 347 (Ct. App. 1996) (quoting

1/olmwr, 522 P.2d at 523-24 ).
;

7

LJ\d i;. v. Kightlinger & (ira). 5C>2 N.L~d3-135.
(I -14

nd. Ct. App. 1990).

' > Na t i~ln\\· iJc l\-1ort:,!ag e Scn·s.. . Inc
,._
Tr.1y La ng l ~y Conslr. Co.. 634 S.E.2d 502, 507
Ct. App.
299.
N.W.
308
.2006);
r "· Sh
Sho..:makt:
ocmak..:r 745
2d
(Neb. 2008); In re
Dissul
u tion (lf"Midnight Star Enter-;.. L.P.. 72-l N.W.2d 334.336 ($D. 2006).

((i<L

' "'84X

F. Supp. 4X2 (S.D.N.Y. I~N4) .
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equity interest in the firm did not vest until his third anniversary as a partner. The
other par1ners voted to expel Ehrlich nine months before his third anniversary. 411 The
firm did not inform him of the meeting at which the vote to expel was taken. and
thus. he was not present at the meeting. 41 Ehrlich claimed that he was expelled to
prevent him from acquiring an equity interest in the firm. 4 ~ Ehrlich sued the lim1 and
his fonner partners on several theories, and the parties ultimately tiled cross-motions
t()r summary judgment.
Ehrlich alleged that his expu lsion breached the finn's partnership agreement and
violated his co-partners' fiduciary duties.4 > These allegations rested on the
defendants' decision to exc lude him from the secret meeting at which the expulsion
vote was taken.~ As the court noted. ·'all partnership agreements in New York
include 'an implied term of good faith."'"'' In the partnership context, "this duty
rises to one of 'finest loyalty' and 'honor most sensitive. "'46 Partners' fiduciary
duties to one another are detined by their agreement. 4 7 With those principles in
mind, the court turned to the parties' agreement.
With respect to voting on finn decisions, the firm's partnership agreement
provided:
4

Every partner shall have one partnership vote for each unit of participation
held by him ....
A partner shall not vote, however, and the number of partnership votes
shall be deemed reduced by the number of partnership votes appertaining
to such partner:

***
(b) if the issue before the partnership is whether such partner ... should
be expe lled. 4 x
As for expulsion, the agreement provided that any partner, other than the senior
par1ncr (which Ehrlich was not). could be expelled upon the artirmative vote of all
other partners. 49 Finally. the agreement detined "pat1ner" to include all partners
whose membership in the firm had not been tem1inated. 5"
40

/d. at 485.

41/d.
42

fd.

43

!d. at 490.

....,d.
4

"1J. at 49 1 (quoting Gelder Mcd. Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 577 (N.Y. 1977)).

46

!d. (quoting Me in hard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N .Y. 1928)).

47

/J. at 491.

4~/d.
4

q

Ehrlich, 848 F. Supp. at 49 1.

5v/d.
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The court read the voting and expulsion provisions of the partnership agreement
to require that the expu lsion of a partner "be 'before the partnership,' i.e., before all
the partn~rs." 5 1 For an expulsion vote to be before the partnership, all partners,
including any partners whose expulsion is being considered, had to be notified of the
vote. 51 This was a critically important right because a partner facing expulsion
needed to sway only one colleague to retain his position.5J
The dcfendanto; countered that the partnership agreement did not require a
meeting to vote to expel a partner, which could be accomplished by circulating a
memorandum.' 4 The court noted, however, that even if this assertion were true, the
issue of Ehrlich's expulsion would still have to be brought "before" the partnership,
and Ehrlich would still be entitled to notice that the vote was taking place.55
The Ehrlich court concluded that it should not re-write an unambiguous
Because Ehrlich's expulsion was not "before the
partnership agreement.~ 6
partnership,'' the defendants' vote to expel him breached the agreement and their
Jiduciary duties 57 The cou11 therefore granted Ehrlich summary judgment on this
issuc. 5 ~

The decision in Ehrlich does more than just illustrate courts' strict construction
of expulsion clauses in pa1tnership agreements; it points to the critical issue in most
expulsion controversies- that is, whether the decision to expel was made in bad
faith. Even where a partnership agreement contains a clear expulsion provision, the
firm's decision to expel a partner must be made in good faith. 59 Partners cannot in
their partnership agreement contract away their obligation of good faith. 60
Clearly, a firm and its remaining partners owe a partner they intend to expel a
dut y of good faith and fair dealing. The source or that duty, however, is unclear. 6 1
The duty must arise either from the partnership agreement o r out of partners'
liduciary duties to one another. Rooting the duty in the partnership agreement is
logical , given that partnership agreements are contracts and the law implies a duty of

·qEhdiciJ, X4S F. Supp. at 491.
55

td (internal quotation marks omitted).

56

/d. lciting Silvcm1an v. Caplin,
N.Y.S.2d
541

546, 546 (N.Y. App. Oiv. 1989)).

7

~ /d. at 492.
<~!d.

;•lve~tal , supra note 3 1, at I I 12; Schwartz, supra note 31, at l.
6

"Winston & Strawn v. Nosal, 664 N.E.2d 239, 243 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (involving
pa11ncrship a;;t premised on UPA , although decision does not rcter to statutes in deciding good
faith issue); Alloy v. Wills Family Trust, 944 A.2d 1234, 1249-50 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008)
(interpreting Oi~trit:L of Columbia law and noting that partners cannot contractually waive
their duty of good faith); R()BERT W. HILLMAN ET AL., TilE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
ACT* 103(b)(5l (2007).
'''Schwartz. supra mllc 31. at 3.
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good faith and fair dealing in every contract. 6~ Traditionally, however, courts have
conceptualized the duty of good faith in intra-partner affairs as a tonn of the
fiduciary duty of loyalty/' 3 or as a close or overlapping relative thereof.64 Courts '
tendency to treat co-partners· duty of good faith as a type or subcategory of fiduciary
duty continues today.~>5 Many courts, however, are uncertain about di fferences
between contractual good faith and tiduciary duties.M
ll is perhaps easiest to frame co-partners' reciprocal duty of good faith as a
fiduc iary duty rather than a contractual obligation. This is because some partnership
agreements provide that a firm may expel a partner for any reason, and contract law
generally holds that there can be no breach of the duty of good faith where the
subject contract expressly permits the challenged action and the defendant acts in
accordance with the ~ontract. 67 Thus, it might be argued that expelling a partner
pursuant to a provision c lause permitting expulsion for any reason cannot be a breach
of the duty of good faith. There should be considerable doubt about the viabi lity of
this argument in any event,''~ but making the duty of good faith a fiduciary duty

*

62
RESTc\TEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS 205 ( 1981 ); sel!. eg, Wilensky v. Blalock.
414 S.E.2d I. 4 (Ga. 1992) (finding implied duty of good fa ith in oral partnership agreement);
Phelps v. Frampton, 170 P.3d 474. 483 (Mont. 2007) (implyi ng duly of good faith and fair
deal ing in partnership agreement).
03

Schwart
z.
supra note 3 1. at 3; see. e.g.. Winston & Strawn. 664 N.E.2d at 245-46; Alloy,
944 A.2d at 1250: Leigh v. Crescent
, 608 Square. l-td.
N.E.2d 11 66, 1169-71 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992).
64See. e.g.. Phelps, 170 P.Jd at 482 (staring that pat1ners ·'have an obligation of good faith
and fair dealing in the discharge of their fiduciary duties of loyalty and care''); Moore v.
Moore. 599 S.E.2d 467, 472 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) ("Partners are fiduciaries to each other and
their relationship is one of mutual trust and confidence, imposing upon them requirements of
loyalty, good !ilith and fair dealing...).

See, e.e.. Poeta v. Jaffe. No. 1357. 200 1 WL 1773885. at *2 ( Pa. Ct. C.P. Oct.
2002,1)
(observing tl~at partners ·'owe each other a fidu ciary duty to act in good fait h during the life of
the partnership.. ).
65

Moalley, supra note II. at 183.
67
Corporate Fin .. Inc. v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1274. 1288 (S.D. Fla.
2006) (citing Snow v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith,
ster Schu
& Russell, P.A., 896 So. 2d 787.
791 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)); Bishop v. Shelt
er Mut. Ins. Co., 129 S. W.3d 500. 505 (Mo.
t
SE ON Til F. LAW
Ct. 1\pp. 2004) (quoting 23 SAMUeL W ILLISTON & RtCII ARD A. LO!W, A T RiiAT
OF Ct>NTRACTS
63:22. at 516 (Jal:k K. Levin et al. eds. 4th cd. 2002)): see also Sanders ,..
Fed Ex Ground Package Sys.• Inc .. 188 1'.3d 1200, 1203 (N.M. 2008)
he ("rTJ implied covenant
of good faith and fa ir dt·aling cannut be us..:d to ov..:n:ome or negate an express term contained
within a contract. .. ).

*

c.~ lf'inslon & Srrall'n. 664 N.E.2d at 246 (eonf\:rrin
dscreti
g b roa di
tlll on partners in
partnership agreement docs not abrogate duty or good faith and fair dealing); Rol~liRT W.
Hll.LMi\N ET AL.. THE REVISF.D U NIFORM PARTNFRSHIP ACT* I03(b)(5) (2007 ed.) (prohibiting
partners from eliminating the duty of good faith and fair dealing in their partnership
agreement}.
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69

rather than a contractua l obligation avoids it altogether. Partners w ho are expelled
for predatory reasons, for example, shou ld not be forced to endure the associated
70
hardship and loss on the basis that they agreed to such savagety. To be sure, in
~ontract law as e lsewhere. general rules inc lude a variety of exceptions, and ditTerent
jurisdictions have long taken different approaches to the duty of good faith and fai r
dealing in the employment realm. 71 Characteriz ing the duty as a fiduciary obligation.
71
however. avoids some theoretical impediments to its enforcement.
Whether the duty of good faith in partner expulsions is a contract-based doctrine
or is appropriately categorized as a type of fiduciary obligation has generated wide
scholarly debate. The importance of that debate is arguably questionable given
cou rts' recognition or the duty of good faith and fair dealing regardless of its
founda tion. What has escaped much attention, however, is RUPA's role in expulsion
controversies. Section 404 ofRUPA provides in pertinent part:
(a) The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the

other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth
subsections (b) and (c).

111

mSt!e Winsto11 & Straw11. 664 N.E.2d at 246 ("'Regardless of the discretion conferred upon
partners under a pa11nership agreement, this does not abrogate their high duty to exercise good
laith and fair dealing in the execution of such discretion.").
70
While the original partners who Iorge an agreement might think they should be able to
consent to expulsion for literally any reason, including economically predatory ones, such an
agreement wou ld be bad public policy. Furthem10re, consider new partners who arc invited to
join the partnershi p well alicr the partnership agreement is struck, as is the case in large Jaw
lirms. A new partner joining a large law linn has no real ability to suggest that the lirm
modify its L'xpulsion clause. New partners invited to join a large law firm are presented the
opportun ity on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. For them. partnership agreements are adhesion
contracts.

11

See. e.g .. Fortune v. Nat' l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-57 (Mass. 1977)
(implying duty or good faith and tair deali ng in employment contract that was expressly
terminable at wi ll without cause or written notice).
7

:Som.:
might
scholars
disagree
with this assertion on the basis that fiduciary duties in
business ussociations should be regarded as default rules that ··can be displaced by explicit
provisions of the contract.'' Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciarv Duties and Limited Parmership
Agreements. 37 SuFFOLK U. L. RFv. 927. 965 (2004). This is not true with respect to the duty
of good fait h and fair dealing. of course. See sources cited supra note 60 and accompanying
text. Other scholars observe that if good taith and tair dealing is a fiduciary duty that can be
contracted away in some business relat ionships, then it may have to be recognized in
contractual form to regulate ostensibly permissible discretionary decisions that dcteat the
parties' reasonable expectations. See Andrew S. Gold. On the Elimination (~( Fiducimy
D111ies: A The(JI:v o{ Good FoithjiJI· Unincorporated Firms. 4 I WAK F. FOREST L. Rr.v. 123,
I74 (2006) (giving example of manager contractually granted absolute discretion in
transactions involving self-dealing violating duty of good faith and fi1ir dealing by
misappropriating a~sets or engaging in fraud on the basis that the panics could never have
contemplated such an cxercis.: of discretion). ln the end, common sense dcrnands recognition
of the duty of good taith and fair dealing on some basis to pre\CIIt or remedy economic
predation by partner~ in the guise of contractually permissible conduct. It is not the Jaw that
··anything. goes·· in partnership relations so long as the partners have a contract.
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(b) A partner's duty or loyalty to the partnership and the other partners is
limited to the following:
(I) to account to the pa11nership and hold as trustee for it any property,
profit, or benef'lt derived by the partner in the conduct and winding up of
the partnership business or derived from a use by the partner of
partnership prOpi:!rty, including the appropriation of a partnership
opportunity;
(2) to refrain ti·om dealing with the partnership in the conduct or winding

up of the partnership business as or on behalf of a party having an interest
adverse to the partnership: and
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the

partnership business be tore the dissolution of the partnership.
(c) A partner's duty of care to the partnership and the other partners in the
conduct and winding up of the partnership['s] business is limited to
refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct,
intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of the law.
(d) A partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and the other
partners under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement and exercise
any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
(e) A partner does not violate a duty or obligation under this [Act] or

under the partnership agreement merely because the partner's conduct
furthers the partner's own interests.73
RUPA notably alters partnership law as it relates to expulsion. 7 ~ Section 404
seems to permit partners to expel a colleague without breaching their duties of
loyalty or care. 7 ~ But such conclusions must be drawn cautiously given the scarcity
of reported expulsion cases decided under section 404. In short, the potential effect
of RUPA in general, and section 404 in particular, on law firm partner expulsion
disputes is speculative.
Accepting as we must the lack ofjudicial guidance on this subject, several points
may still be made. First, not all states that have adopted RUPA embrace the narrow
fiduciary duties in sections 404(a) and (b). 71' It is thus important in cases governed
by RUPA to examine controlling statutes instead of assuming the application of
section 404 as drafted. Second, section 404(d) treats the duty of good faith and fair
73 ROBERT W . Hll.I.MAN J:TAI.., T HE REVISF.O UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT§ 404 (2007).
7
~Dona ld .J. Nettles. Comment, Do Wl' Really Need Expulsion Provisions in Partnership
Agreements: The Inadequacies of Parmership LaH· a~· It Relates 10 Daw Partnerships, 25 J.

L EGAL PROF. 209. 2 t 3 (200 I).
75

/d. a! 2 14.

1<'See. e.g, Enea v. Superior CoUJt. 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 517-18 (Cl. App. 2005)
(discussing the different California approach to duty ofloyahy).
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dealing as a contract law concept. 77 RUPA does not define good faith and fair
dealing, however, leaving that task to courts ''based on the experience of real
cases. " 7M If case law develops as expected, courts wi II treat the good faith
requirement "as an 'excluder'-a phrase with no general meaning or meanings of its
own. Instead, it functions to rule out many different forms of bad faith."7~ Third,
partners may not eliminate the duty of good faith and fair dealing through language
in their partnership agreement, but they may agree on reasonable standards for its
measure. 8° Finally, the section 404(e) statement that partners do not breach their
duties to a co-partner or the partnership merely through self-i nterested conduct
should not be interpreted to mean that partners may pursue their own interests
without regard for their colleagues or firms. 81 Rather, partners may further their own
interests without breaching any intra-firm duties if their actions are fully disclosed
and are ''fair to the partnership and the other partners."~~ In other words, there is
sci f-interest and then there is something more, and partners cannot justify the lattereconomically predatory behavior. lor instance- by cloaking it in the protective
fabric ol' section 404(e).
Regardless of the doctrinal underpinnings of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing. it is true going forward, as it always has been. that the duty's contours are
shaped by the facts of real cases. And so it is to those cases that we now tum.
Ill. LAW FIRM

P,\RT
N
SHIP
EREXPULSION

IN TH E COURTS

It is difficult to cato::gorizc the cases on good faith in law firm partnership
expulsions because of the persistent concern that the ostensibly legitimate reasons
offered by firms tor ousting partners are pretextual. Also, cases may involve
multiple and overlapping issues. This Part will characterize expulsion cases as
involving (a) economically self-interested behavior by firms and their remaining
partners, or (b) firms· response to disruptive or disharmonious conduct by partners.
It will then analyze the line between good faith and bad taith in the expulsion
context.

A.

EXPULSION FURTHERING ECONOMIC S EU ' -INTEREST

Holman v. Coie83 is the seminal case on bad faith in law firm partnership
expulsions. Holman involved a law firm in Washington State with exceptionally
close ties to the Boeing Company. Among the firm's twenty-two partners were two
77

ROBERT W . HILLMAN ET AL. , THE REVIS ED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT

§ 404 cmt. 4

(2007).
78Jd.
71
' /d.

(quoting RobertS. Summers. ..Good Faith .. in General Comract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195. 262 ( 1968) (intemal
quotation marks omitted)).

gn/d.
s Welch v. Via Chri~ti Health Partners. Inc .• 133 P.3d 122, I 39 (Kan. 2006).
1

82

/d. (quoting Edwin W. Hecker. Jr., The Kansas Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 68 J.

KAN. B. ASS' N, 16,32 (1999))
3

x 522 P.2d 5 I 5 (Wash. Ct.
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brothers, William and Francis Holman. both of whom sat on the firm 's executive
committee. Over the years, William Holman had questioned whether the firm was
charging Boeing adequate fees and whether senior partners at the firm were pulling
their own weight. There was. over time, discussion by other members of the
executive committee about whether the Holmans should be asked to leave the fim1
given their perspectives. The Holmans viewed their provocative inquiries as
business matters appropriate for executive committee consideration; they were
unaware that they were upsetting the other members of the committee.~4
In the mid- to late-1960s. Francis Holman was elected first to the Washington
State House of Representatives and later to the State Senate.his In
elected service.
he took positions or made public statements that inflamed senior Boeing officials:' '
One Boeing onicial alleged that Francis exploited his attorney-client relationship
with the company in connection with some legislation .~··
On May 7. 1969. the executive committee::, sans the Holmans and one other
member who was overseas, convened secretly to discusse th Holmans' possible
expulsion from the linn .~- The committee favored expu lsio n but took no action then.
Another executive committee meeting was <:onvened on May 13 to which the
Holmans were summoned and which was scheduled to accommodate Francis
Holman's return from his legislative duties. 8~ At this meeting, the executive
committee, without giving reasons for their action. ~!xpellcd the Holmans by a 7-2
vote. 89 The Holmans then sued the firm. The trial court dismissed the suit and the
plaintiffs appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals. 90
The finn's partnership agreement provided that any partner could be expelled by
a majority vote of the executive committee.'>~ The agreement did not require notice
to subject partners, " a statement of reasons [for expu Is ion), a showing of good cause.
or a hearing."~~
The Holmans contended that the executive committee's actions on May 13
violated due process because they were not notified of their looming expulsions, the
reasons for their expulsion were never specified, and they were afforded no
opportunity to be heard. 93 The court rejected their arguments based on the express
language of the partnership agreement, which required none of those things.Y4 To

84

/d. at 517.

8

~/d. at 518.

86Jd.
87

/d. at 519.

8
g Holman.

522 P.2d at 519.

~')!d.

90/d.
91 /d.
92

/d. (quoting The r>artnership Agreement§ 1.2).

93

Holman. 522 P.2d

at

521 .

'"Jd. at 52 1-23.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009

13

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

\06

[Vol. 57:93

accept the Holmans' arguments would require the court to re-write the partnership
agreement, which it was unwilling to do. 95
More to the point. the plaintiffs challenged their expulsions on the bases that they
were not bona fide and were not in good faith , and contended that such requirements
should be implied in the partnership agreement. 96 The plaintiffs' use of the tem1
"bona fide" came from a Washington partnership statute based on the UPA; the
reference to good faith came from a dictionary definition of "bona tide."'li While
recognizing that "partners in their dealings with each other must exercise good
faith," the Holman court could not accept the plaintiffs' position.''8 The court
reasoned that partners' good faith obligations to one another relate to the business
aspects or property of their partnership. ~9 In contrast. the " [p]laintiffs' claims [did)
not relate to the business aspects or the property rights of the partnership. There
[was) no evidence [that) the purpose of the severance was to gain any business or
property advantage to the remaining partners." 100 The court therefore concluded that
the firm had not breached its duty of good faith to the Hoi mans. 1111
Of course, the Holmans' expulsion did confer a business advantage to the (·l rm
and its remaining partners-it appeased the firm's most important client, Boeing. If
Boeing were to move its business to another firm because of Francis Holman's
aggravating legislative activities, the finn would suffer a business catastrophe.
Indeed, whenever a firm expels a partner to preserve client relationships or the tirm 's
reputation, the remaining partners receive a business or financial advantage. 102 Thus,
following Holman, partners are permitted to obtain some level of business advantage
through expulsion without being guilty of bad faith. Common sense and the nature
of modern law practice demand as much. But where does one draw the good faith
versus bad faith line? Conventional wisdom is that Holman draws the line at
expulsions motivated by "an economically predatory purpose."103
In Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray,104 the partner who was expelled, Lawlis, had
become an alcoholic in 1982. He revealed his alcoholism to the fim1 in 1983. The
finn supportively matched him with a physician specializing in the treatment of
alcoholism. 105 The firm also required him to sign a contract setting forth conditions
for his continued partnership, which specitied that the fim1 would not give him a

95

Jd. at 523.

96

Jd.

97/d.
98

Holman. 522 P.2d at 523.

99/d.
100

/d. (emphasis added).

101/d.
101

Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S. W.2d 543, 552 (Tex. 1998) (Hecht, J., concurring).

101
· Vestal, supra

note 3 1, at 1092.

104

562 N. E.2d 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).

10

' /d. at 438.
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"second chance'' to right his career. H16 In early March 1984. Law lis begun abusing
alcohol again, but the finn gave him a second chance when he sought treatment. 11' 7
The finn imposed yet additional conditions on his continued partnership and reduced
his partnership units, thereby reducing his compensation. The firm promised that
Lawlis would be restored to full partnership. i.e., his partnership units wou ld be
increased. if he met the conditions imposed in his new behavioral contract. 10x Lawlis
believed that he met those conditions and, in October 1986, proposed to the firm\
finance committee that his partnership units be increased from 60 to 90 for I987w••
Instead, the finance committee recommended that the finn tenninate him. The fim1
offered Lawlis a severance package including a six month period at reduced
compensation to make a smooth transition out of the firm. When Lawlis declined
this offer, the senior partners of the firm expelled him by a 7- I vote in February
1987. 110
Lawlis sued the tinn for breach of contract. The trial court granted summary
judgment for the tinn. Lawlis then sought review by the Ind iana Court of
Appeais_l 11
The firm ' s partnership agreement provided that a partner cou ld be expelled at any
time by a two-thirds majority vote of the tim1' s senior partners upon such terms as
the senior partners set. 112 Lawlis contended that his expulsion violated the duty of
good faith and fair dealing implied in the partnership agreement because he was
expelled for the predatory purpose of increasing the firm' s lawyer-to-partner ratio for
profitability purposes, which was a stated goal in the firm 's five-year plan. 111 As he
dramatical ly framed the argument:
Obviously, the easiest way for the Partnership to improv~ its lawyer to
partner ratio, and thus increase the top partners' saiaries, was to eliminate
a senior partner. Lawlis' position in the Partnership had been weakened
by his absences due to illness. The remaining partners knew this and
pounced upon the opportun ity to devour Lawlis' partnership interest_l 14
The court in Lawlis agreed that if the power to expel partners granted in a
partnership agreement is exercised in "bad faith," or, as Lawlis phrased it, for "a
'predatory purpose,"' then those exercising that power have breached the
agreement_l 15 But as the court saw it Lawlis ' claims of predatory purpose were

!till/d.
107/d.
10~/c/.
IOQ Lawlis,

562 N. E.2d at 438.

1111/c/.
I ll /d.
112

/d.

113

/c/. at 440.

at 439-40.

Lawlis, 562 N.E.2d at 440 (quoting Lawlis' appellau:: brief).

11 1
'

115/d.
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belied by the firm ' s compassionate treatment of him during his period of intense
alcoholism. 116 The firm carried him for years and even gave him a second chance to
resurrect his career when he had contractually agreed that he would receive no
second chance. Furthem1ore, instead of recommending his immediate expulsion, the
finn had proposed a severance package and a six-month period of continued
employment so that he might make a career transitton. The undisputed facts
demonstrated that the firm had acted in good faith in expelling Lawlis. 117
Lawlis next claimed that the linn breached its fiduciary duty to him ''by expell ing
him for the predatory purpose of increasing partner income,'' although he
acknowledged that the fiduciary duty owed him was "intertwined with the duty of
good faith and fai r dealing.'' 11& The court rejected this argument, noting the potential
hann to the tinn that Lawlis' alcohol abuse posed and the firm' s need to take
cotTectivc action. 1 ~'1
Summing up partners' duty of good faith and fa ir dealing owed to one another,
the court explained:
Where the remaining partners in a lirm deem it necessary to expel a
partner under a no cause expulsion clause in a partnership agreement
freely negotiated and entered into, the expelli ng partners act in "good
faith" regardless of motivation if that act docs not cause a wrongful
withhold ing of money or property legally due the expelled . .. . 110
In this instance, the senior partners acted in the belief that the partnership agreement
gave them the right to expel Lavvlis as in fact it did. 1 ~ 1 There was no evidence that
their decision was animated by greed. Thus, the court concluded that they acted in
good faith. 122
Lml'!is is an interesting case for several reasons.123 First, it illustrates the
difficulty in categorizing expulsion cases as being based either on a finn's economic
sell:.interest or the preservation of good will by removing disruptive partners because
the facts suggest some of both. Second, the court's reliance on the firm's
compassion toward Lawlis as evidence of its good faith was arguably misguided.
The linn's five-year plan calling for an adjustment in its lawyer-to-partner ratio
came out after Lawlis seemingly conquered his alcoholism and after he proposed an
116

/d. at440-4 1.

117

/d. at 441.

11

x/d. (quot ing Lawlis' appe llate brief).

11

qLawlis, 562 N.E.2d at 442.

• ~u /d. at 442-43.
111

1

/d. at 443.

~ 11' you think abo ut it, Lawlis· ti ming was horrible. After several years or being an
unproducti
deed,ve partn..:r and, in
a downright dangerous one, he sought a fifty percent
increase in his compensati on just as the tirm was initiating its tough five-year plan. Would the
firm- which had shown Lawlis great compassion as he stn;ggled w ith his illness-have
expelled him had he been <:Ontcnt wi th 60 partnership units rather thrm seeking an increase to
ninety? Lawlis might have been wise
rememher
to
that pigs get fat, hogs get slaughtered.

3
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increase in his partnership units. 124 Times change, and the tact that the fim1 once
showed Lawlis great compassion does not mean that the senior partners could not
have seized on his illness as a pretext for expelling him once the firm ·s long-range
planning process revealed to them the need to increase the fim1's leverage. Third,
why did the firm expel Lawlis when it did after carrying him tor several years? The
fact that the firm did not have to articulate cause for his expulsion docs not mean that
it was entitled to immunity. Was not the timing of the firm's decision suspicious?
The Lawlis court effectively adopted the Holman view that bad faith in the
expulsion context requires an economically predatory purpose. 115 The underlying
issue is whether the court correctly concluded that the firm's goal of increasing
profits per partner in part by adjusting its lawyer-to-partner ratio as set forth in its
five-year plan was not predatory. To be sure, the court charitably construed the plan
in the firm's favor,121' but that does not mean it erred. Law firms are businesses. The
pursuit of increased profits is normal business behavior. Expelling partners who are
not sufllciently contributing to the firm's profitability or who are dragging it down is
a means of increasing fim1 profits. It seems probable that Lawlis' alcoholism
prevented him from materially contributing to the firm's practice during the years
immediately preceding his expulsion. On this record. the court simply could not
have concluded that his expulsion was economically predatory.
The latest economic self-interest case to receive widespread attention is Beaslev
v. Cadwalader. Wickersham & Tajt. 1 ~ Beasley joined Cadwalader's Palm Beach,
Florida oftlce as a lateral partner in 1989. He was by all accounts "an extraordinary
rainmaker and a skilled litigator.''m The Palm Beach office's profitability increased
significantly over the next three years. although it was somewhat of an
uncomfortable place because of another senior partner's personality issues.' ~'' In
1993, the Palm Beach office lost money for the tirst time since Beasley came on
board. 130 Also in 1993. Cadwalader's share value decreased by $1 I ,000, a
nettlesome development given that pat1ners were compensated based on the number
of their shares. 131 In 1994, the firm's share value decreased by another $ 15,000,
upsetting a number of younger, highly productive partners. One of these partners.
Link, made clear to the firm's management committee that if this course was not
reversed, the younger group would leave. 132 Thus came " Project Right Size" through
1

124

See Lawlis. 562 N. E.2d at 438. 440 (providing a timing of events).

125

See id. at440, 442-43.

126See

id.

at

440-41 (discussing the

fim1"s

live-year plan as ''read in full").

127

No. CL-94-8646 "AJ", 1996 WL 438777 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23. 19%). a.f(d in part.

rev 'din part, 728 So. 2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
128

/d.

at

*1 .

129Jd.

130/d.

ll lld.
132 Beasley,
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which the firm aimed to identify ''less productive partners for elimination from the
g
partnership."m
Closin the Palm Beach oftice became a focus of Project Right Size, with the
purpose being to improve the remaining partners· compensation and to retain the
disgruntled young Turks. 1 3 ~ "The watershed of the pr~ject was a c landestine all day
management committee meeting" in early August 1994, which identified seventeen
partners for expulsion, including all of the Florida partners. 135 The management
committee finally voted to close the Palm Beach oftice in late August 1994. 136 The
management committee's plan to expel seventeen partners met opposition, but the
pa11nership endorsed it by a 67-12 vote in October. 137
One day after the second management committee meeting. the firm informed the
Palm Beach partners that their office would close at the end of the year. In
September 1994, the co-chair of the management committee. G lascoff, went to Palm
Beach to talk to the partners. While he said that the management committee would
consider allowing some of them to transfer to New York, he and Beasley agreed it
would be impractica l for Beasley to do so.u~ Indeed, the trial court would later find
that Beasley's transfer from Florida to New York (or to Washington. D.C., as was
further discussed) was so grossly impractical that the fim1's otTer of it could not have
been made in good faith. 139
Beasley and the firm unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate terms for his
departure tor approximately two months. 140 By November, their relationship had
deteriorated to the point that Beasley sued the firm for wrongful expulsion and for
breaching its fiduciary duties to him. 141 The firm rousted Beasley from his office
shortly thereafter. 141
The case was decided under New York law, which tollows the UPA! 43 The
Cadwalader partnership agreement contained no expulsion clause. 14~ Thus. if the
firm expelled Beasley, it breached the agreement. 145 If Beasley withdrew from the
firm, on the other hand, there was no breach. Cadwalader urged that Beasley had
withdrawn because (I) "the management committee had the power to close branch
133/cl.
114
135

/d. at n.2.

/d. a t *2.

136 /d.

137

Beasley, 1996 WL 438777, at *3.

13M/d.

I.N/d.
140/cl.
141

Beasley. I 996 WL 438777, a1 *I (stating claims); id. at *3 (giving date.:: litigation
commenced).
1

~ 2 /d.

143

a1 *3.

See id. at *4.

144

/d. at *3.

145

Beaslev. 1996 WL 438777. a1 *3.
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offices'' and thus, it was impossible for him to have been expelled: and (2) the firm
offered him partnership in New York or Wash i ngton. ~1 ' The trial court rejected both
arguments.
Although it was clear that the firm's management committee had the power to
close branch offices as part of its overall managerial authority, it was equal ly clear
given the lack of related language in the partnership agreement that it did not have
the power to expel partners in those offices (or anywhere else, l()r that matter). ~ As
noted earlier, it was not practical tor Beasley to transfer to New York or Washington.
Given that his practice was rooted entirely in Flo1;da. he wou ld have arrived in either
office with no business. and the finn was expelling unproductive partners both
places. Nothing about such a transfer made sense. 1 4~ Thus, the court determined that
the fim1' s offer of a transfer cou ld not have been made in good faith and Beasley was
justitied in declining it. 1 4~
Cadwalader's argument that Beasley had withdrawn from the partnership by
suing the fim1 was undone by a lack of supporting authority. Whi le the firm could
offer no cases to support its position, Beasley amassed numerous cases holding that
if a suit for dissolution of a partnership is non-frivolous, it cannot constitute a
voluntary withdrawal.
Moreover, New York partnersh ip statutes expressly
contemplated suits between partners. 150 The trial court theretore concluded that
Beasley had not voluntarily withdrawn from the tirm. 1; 1
It was clear to the trial court that Cadwa lader had expelled Beasley."" That
brought the cou rt to Beasley 's breach of fiduciary duty claim. Beasley alleged that
the fim1 breached its fiduciary duty to him by expelling him in violation or the
partnership agreement, by not disclosing its plan to close the Palm Beach office and
terminate the partners there, and "(b]y expelling him and the other partners tor the
financ ial gain of the remaining partners.'"151
In evaluating the finn's fiduciary duty. the trial court seized upon Justice
Cardozo' s opinion in MeinharJ v. Salmon. 154 In that opinion, Cardozo wrote that copartners owe each other a ..duty of the tinest loyalty" and explained that for those
who owe fiduciary duties, as partners do. '·[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of' an
honor the most sensitive. is then the standard of behavior." 1 ~~ This. the tria l cou11
detennined, was the standard by which Cadwalader's actions had to be judged. 1 ;~
1

1

7

14(' /d.
147/d.

at *4.

148/d. at *3.

14'!Beasley , 1996 WL 438777, at *4.
150/d.

ISI Jd.
152

See id. at *5 texplaining reasoning).

153 /d.
154

164 N.E. 545 (N.Y . 1928).

15 5/d.

156

at 546.

Beasley, 1996 WL
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The trial court found that Beasley and the other partners were ousted for the
''express purpose of producing greater profits for the remaining partners. " 157 The
management committee could have avoided trouble by proposing to the partnership
that it amend the partnership agreement to allow for expulsion. 158 Instead of doing
that, as one partner had wisely proposed. the committee ''ben[t] to the will of the
disgruntled partners by expelling other partners to whom they O\ved a fiduciary
duty." 159 This was not an instance of the management committee simply fulfilling its
managerial function . " Rather, [the committee] was participating in a clandestine
plan to wrongfully expel some partners tor the financial gain of other partners. " 160
There was no way to describe such activity as "honorable,'' much less to find that it
comported with ''the punctilio of an honor[.]" 161
Next. the trial court considered the finn's defense based on Beasley's unclean
hands. As it turned out, Beasley was planning on leaving Cadwalader during the
spring and early summer of 1994. 162 He had even approached three Cadwalader
associates about joining him at a new tirm starting in September 1994. Naturally, he
did not disclose his plans to the firm. 1(> 1 Beasley and his potential new partner could
not reach an agreement. however. and his new venture never launched. 1M The trial
court found that Beasley had not breached his fiduciary duty to Cadwalader by
secretly planning to start a new firm, but, even if he had, it would be inequitable to
allow his actions to trump Cadwalader's more egregious conduct. 165 As the trial
court colorfully summarized matters, "[i]f Beas ley had dirt under his fingernails ,
[Cadwalader] was up to its elbows in the dung heap." 1 ~6
The trial court concluded that Beasley was entitled to recover punitive damages
for Cadwalader' s breach of fiduciary duty. 107 As the court explained:
When [a] partnership encounters foul weather. the partners must either all
stay the course or all abandon it. Under the facts of this case, it was a
gross breach offiduci<~ry duty for some partners to throw others overboard
for the expediency of increased profits .... [T]hcse facts establish at least
conduct which was so reckless as to amount to a conscious disregard for
the rights of Beasley and the other expelled partners. 1 ~>s
157

/d. at *6.

160

Beasley , 1996 WL 43R77, at *6

11 1
' /d.

(quotiug Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545.546 (N.Y. 1928)).

161/d.

11>.1/d.

11>4/d.
165

8easlcy, 1996 WL 43877 7. at *6.

11 7
' /d.

at *9.

l t>.~ld. at *7.
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The court ultimately awarded Beasley compensatory and punitive damages totaling
nearly $2.5 million, plus interest. 1 ~Q
Cadwalader appealed the judgment. The appellate court accepted the trial court's
reasoning with respect to liability. 1711 The appellate court also affirmed the punitive
damage award. 171 In some consolation to the finn, the appellate court did reverse
and remand with respect to two components of the trial court's compensatory
damages award.
Of the cases to dat~. Beasley holds Ia\\ firms to the highest standard of conduct
when expelling partners. The lack of an expulsion provision in the firm's
partnership agreement, however. doubtlessly colored the trial court's judgment. 172
There obviously would have been no breach of the partnership agreement had it
included an expulsion provis ion, but beyond that. the trial COUt1's harsh criticism or
the tirm might have been softened had then~ been an expulsion clause arguably
permitting the firm to act as it did. Regardless, the lack of an expulsion clause in the
Cadwa lader partnership agreement is a major distinguishing factor shou ld other
courts or litigams be tempted to rely on Beasley when analyzing expulsion-related
liability. As tor those who would disregard the case on the basis that the most
damning language appears in the non-precedential trial court opinion, consider that
the appellate COLII1 did not disturb the trial court's liability findings and anirmed the
punitive damage award. 173 Thus, while it may be possible to discount the case as
principally being the handiwork of an inferior court. it cannot safely be ignored on
those grounds.

B. Expulsions to Preserve Trust or Reputation
Law finns expel partners for reasons other than exclusively economic selfinterest. Firms may expel lawyers to preserve or protect intra-firm relationships,
preserve their good will or reputations, mitigate or punish objectively disruptive or
destructive behavior, or preserve the personal confidence and trust essential to
partnership. 174 It is not bad faith to expel a partner to resolve a partnership schism. 175
On the other hand, claims of disruption or embarrassing, incompatible or
disreputable conduct cannot be used to excuse a finn's predatory or retaliatory

~ /d. at *9.

1 9

m•cadwaladcr, Wicker:;ham & Taft v. Beasley. 72~ So. 2d 253 , 255-56 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998).
171

/d. at 258-59.

171

At least one other Cadwalader partner expelled as rcsuh of Project Right Size sued the
finn. Alan Ruskin won a $3 million jury verdict. Ruskin'~ case is not the subject of a
reported opinion. Vestal. supra note 3 1, at I I 04-05.
173

Beaslel'
,
728 So. 2d at 255, .258-59

174See.

e.g.. Hogan\'. Monon, No. OJAOI-9206-C'H-00214, 1993 WL 64220, *1 nn.l , 6
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 1993) (invnh
·ing
partner who was expelled tor his alTair with a
married associate: tht!re was a question of f.1ct about the existence of a partnership agreement
containing an expulsion provision and the plaintiiTs rights under it).
175 Waite , .. Sylvester. 560 A.2d 619.623 (N.H. 1989); Leigh v. Crescent Square, Ltd .. 60R
N. E.2d 1166, 1171 (Ohio
Ct.
App. 1992).
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expulsion of <1 partner. There is no room for pretext here. Partners are owners of
their firms and they are entitled to reasonably dissent from fim1 decisions and to
question decisions made by linn leaders or managers. Not every disagreement
within a partnership, even if impassioned or prolonged, qualities as a "schism." A
firm cannot expel a partner on the ba~is that her continued presence would be
disruptive or fractious when the partner is simply exercising her rights under the
partnership agreement ''~> This is true even if the agreement does not require cause
for expulsion. or permits expulsion for any reason. The discretion conferred upon
partners under a partnership agreement, no matter how broad, cannot "abrogate their
high duty to exercise good faith and fair dealing in the execution of such
discretion. " 177
Firms' concerns about their reputations and disruptive internal relationships may
have economic overtones, of course. and sometimes internal and external
considerations become inextricably intertwined when the subject is a partner' s
expulsion. That was the situation in Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Stttro. 118
Phil ip Heller joined the Los Angeles office of the firm once known as Pillsbury
Madison & Sutro as a latera l partner in January 1990. 179 In February 1991 , he was
quoted in a story in local society magazine as bragging about dating "an
embarrassing number of women.'' 1 ~0 The photo accompanying the story showed him
leaning against his Porsche. The same month, he attempted to land Apple
Computer's employment litigation work and. in the process. sabotaged efforts by a
fellow partner who was attempting to do the same thing. Though the extent of
Heller's treachery vis-a-\·is his fe llow partner may not have been apparent to Apple,
the company decided not to hire Pillsbury because the firm appeared to be
disorganized and uncoordinatt:d. 1 ~ 1 Later, Heller caused the firm some difficulty
when he attempted to bring in a new matter for the Reebok Company outside of the
finn 's normal procedure for checking conf'licts ofinterest. 182
The relationship between Pillsbury and Heller increasingly soured in May and
June 1992 as a result of Heller's bi;carre communications with executives at Bank of
America (the "Bank''), one of Pillsbury's most important clients. The Bank's
general counsel. Michael Halloran (a former Pillsbury partner in the firm's San
Francisco office), had been featured in a story in American Lawyer magazine. 1g3 On
May 21. 1992, Heller wrote Hal loran a letter stating that Halloran 's picture
accompanying the story was "almost a caricature of' what Michael Lewis described

17 .
hSee t! g ..

Winston & Strawn v. Nosal. 664 N.E.2d 239. 243-46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)
(imolving partner who wa~ seeking acces~ to linn's books and records as provided for in
partn.:rship agreement).
1 7
' /d

at 246.

11

Cal. Rptr. 2d

~5R

''td. li

336 <C t. App. 1996).

at 339.

1 0

~ /d. at .l40 (quoting Wh1· L.A. Men Won't Commi1. Los A NGELES MA<i .. Feb. 199 1).

IXI/d
.

!Kl HC'IIer.

5l\ Cal. Rptr. 2d at .l41.
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in Liar's Poker [sic] as ·one big swinging dick. '" 1 ~ 4 Heller sent a copy of the letter
to the Bank's CEO, Richard Rosenberg. 185 On May 27, Heller sent Halloran a copy
of a story about a husband who went to his secretary's apartment for a sexual liaison
and disrobed, only to find his wife and chi ldren there. 186 Heller also copied
Rosenberg on this mai l ing. 1 ~ 7 This prompted one of Halloran's senior subordinates,
David Grimes, to call Rodney Peck. a Pillsbury partner and a member of the tirm's
executive committee. to ask that Heller send no more letters to Rosenberg. 18 R G rimes
believed that if Heller's letters did not stop, the Bank wou ld tem1inate its relationship
with Pillsbury. It is unclear whether G rimes knew at the time about Heller's May 27
letter. Peck certainly did not, because he queried Heller as to whether he had written
Halloran since May 21, and Heller denied doing so.'R~ Heller then asked Peck
whether he should apologize to either Halloran or Rosenberg, and Peck told him no.
Heller disobeyed Peck and wrote a letter of apology to Rosenberg on June 2. 190
On June 9, the firm's executive committee met to consider Heller' s expulsion
from the firm . The committee discussed the magazine article in which Heller
boasted of his romantic prowess, Heller's disruptive behavior in attempting to attract
Apple's employment business, the Reebok matter, Heller's communications with the
Bank, and his performance overall. 19 1 The committee approved Heller's expulsion.
The next day, Grimes called Peck about the May 27 and June 2 letters and told him
that the Bank would remove Pillsbury from its list of approved outside counsel if it
received one more letter from Heller. 191
Grimes' second call spurred the li1m to immediate action. 1'11 Several members of
the executive committee hastily met with Heller and offered him a chance to resign
from the finn. When he refused, the firm expelled him. 1 '~4
Heller sued the tirm and several pa11ners on a variety of theories and his case
reached the California appellate courts after the trial court dismissed some of his
claims and a jury could not reach a verdict on others.' ~5 Among other th ings, Heller
argued that the executive committee breached the partnership agreement by
expelling him without cause. This claim went nowhere because the agreement
184 /d. (quoting Letter from Philip Heller to Michael Halloran. Executive Vice president
and Gen. Counsel of Bank of Am. (May 2 1. 1992)).
185/d.

IXo/d.
187

Jt may be interred that Heller copied Rosenberg on both mailings as Grimes asked Peck
''that no more Jeffers be sent to Rosenberg:· /d. (emphasis added).
'

88

Heller. 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341.

1~9/d

1')0/d.
]Of /d.
192/d.

13
" Heller.
1? 4 /d.

58 CaL Rptr . .:?d at 34 I.

at 342.

I Q5Jd.
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clearly provided for expulsion without cause. 196 His argument that his expulsion
violated the firm's implied duty of good faith and fair dealing was equally
unavailing, given that the partnership agreement authorized expulsions "through 'the
guillotine approach'" and the firm expelled him pursuant to the agreement. 197
Heller further contended that the trial court erred when it rejected his claims for
breach of fiduciary duty. The court in Heller recognized that partners owe each
other and their finn a fiduciary duty. 1Qk But that duty attaches only "where one
partner could take advantage of his position to reap personal profit or act to the
partnership's detriment."; 99 There was no evidence that Pillsbury expelled Heller to
enrich the remaining partners. ~ 00 When he was expelled, Heller was compensated at
the low end of the firm's compensation range and the firm had more than 200
partners."'11 Any benefit that flowed to the remaining partners was therefore so
insubstantial as to be immaterial to the decision to expel him.~02
More impottant, however, was the effect of Heller's behavior on the tirm. 203 The
evidence revealed that the executive committee had expelled him because it lost trust
in him. ~u• The Heller court adopted this reasoning from the Washington Court of
Appeals' decision in /-/ulman v. Coie: 205
The foundation of a professional relationship is personal confidence and
trust. Once a schism develops, its magnitude may be exaggerated
rightfully or wrongfully to the point of destroying a hannonious accord.
When such occurs, an expeditious severance is desirable. To imply terms
not expressed in this partnership agreement frustrates the unambiguous
language of the agreement and the result contemplatcd. 206
The court accordingly affirmed the trial court' s dismissal of Heller's breach of
fiduciary duty claim.z07
Heller makes clear that firms may expel partners in whom they have lost trust as
a result of disruptive or disreputable behavior. Heller embarrassed the tirm through
his public quote, he greedily sabotaged a fellow partner' s business development
etTorts. he refused to comply with firm business intake procedures, he lied to an
1 6
0J

/d. at 346.

1 7
'J

/d. at 347 (quoting Holman v. Coie, S22 P.2d SIS, S23-24 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)).

~ /Mier, SR Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348.

1 8

1 19
' /d

(quoting Leigh v. Crescent Square. Ltd .. 608 N .E.2d 1166, 1170 (Ohio
Ct.

App.

1992)).

111 1

/d. at 348 n.7.

2

~" /d. at 3411.

:.i.'!MIC!r. 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348 .
.'11-1/d.
2

<'$522 P.2d SIS (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).

1

'u'Hcl/er. 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348 (quoting flo/man, 522 P.2d at S24).

207/d.
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executive committee member, and he disobeyed the same executive committee
member's reasonable instruction. Even if Heller's bizarre mailings to Halloran and
Rosenberg had not jeopardized the firm 's client relationship with the Bank, they
were so outrageously inappropriate as to have destroyed other partner~· faith and
trust in him. Heller's expulsion was handsomely justified.
Although firms · abi lity to expel partners because of" loss of trust in them free;:
from the fear of associated liability requires recognition, that ability must have
reasonable limits. A Texas case, Bohatch 1'. Butler & Binion,M represents a
troubling test of those limits.
Before launching into a discussion of the decision in Bohatch. a little background
is in order. Most jurisdictions require lawyers to report serious misconduct by other
lawyers to disciplinary authorities on pain of professional discipline if they do not. 21"1
This requirement derives from Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.3(a), which
provides: "A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the
210 Billing fraud clearly requires reporting under
appropriate professional
authority.''
Rule 8.3(a).
Returning now to the case. Colette Bohatch was a partner in the Washington.
D.C. office of Texas-based Butler & Binion.lll John McDonald was the office's
managing partner, and another partner, Richard Powers. also worked there. The
three lawyers worked mostly on Pennzoil business. As a pa1tner, Bohatch received
firm reports on lawyers' billings. Reviewing these reports, she became concerned
that Mc Donald was overbilling Pennzoil.~ 1 1 She discussed the matter with Powers,
and they jointly reviewed McDonald's time records, which heightened her
concerns. ~• -' As a result, she rep01ted her concerns to the firm's managing partner.
Louis Paine, and to two members of the fi1m's management committee, R. Hayden
Bums and Marion McDaniel. 2 1 ~ Paine and Burns investigated Bohatch's complaint.
They reviewed Pcnnzoil bills and supporting records. and they also spoke with
Penm::oil in-house lawyer John Chapman. the finn·s primary contact at the
company .m He told them that Pennzoil
found
McDona ld's bills to be reasonable.11 6
In August 1990. Paine met with Bohatch and rero1ied that the firm· s
investigation had clear~d McDonald. Continuing, he told her that she should begin

10

~977 S. W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998 J

209

Douglas R. Richmond, Lmr Firm Partners as The ir Bm1her~pers
·Kee,

96 KY. L..J. 231.

252 (2008).
: 10 MO D~J. R t;LES OF PK0£''1. CONDUC"I R . 8.3(a) (2008l.
21 1

Buharch. 977 S.W.2d at 54-l.

212/d
.

~"ld.

2i4/d.
215

Bohatc:h. 977 S.W.2d a l 544.

216/d.
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seeking other cmployment. 217 The firm promptly stopped assigning her work.m In
January 1991 , the firm denied Bohatch her year-end partnership distribution for 1990
and erased her expected compensation for 1991 by reducing her tentative partnership
distributions to zero. 219 The firm stopped paying her in June 1991. 220 In August
1991 . the firm told her to vacate her office by November.~ 2 1 Bohatch found new
employment by September 1991. She sued the firm in late October 1991 , and the
rirm expelled her three days laterY~
Bohatch alleged three theories of liability in her suit: wrongful discharge. breach
or fiduciary duty, and breach of the fiml·s partnership agreement based on the duty
or good faith and lair dealing.~~ 1 The trial court granted Butler & Binion partial
summary judgment on Bohatch's wrongful discharge claim and on her claims for
breach or fiduciary duty and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing for
conduct occurring after her she was expelled.~ 2 ~ The trial court allowed the
remaining claims for conduct occurring before her expulsion to go to trial, and a jury
f()und that the firm breached its fiduciary duty and had breached its parinership
agreement .2~ 5 Bohatch ultimately was awarded $307,000 in compensatory damages
and $237.000 in punitive damagesY 6 Both sides appealed.
The Texas Court of Appeals concluded that Butler & Binion's only duty to
F3ohatch was not to expel her in bad faith, which, in this context, would have
required that the firm expel her for the remaining partners' self-gain. 227 There was
no evidence of that, and thus, the court of appeals determined that the firm did not
breach its tiduciary duty to her.m The court of appeals did conclude, however, that
the firm breached its partnership agreement and that Bohatch was accordingly
entitled to damages of $35,000, plus attomey's fees of $225,000. 229 Bohatch then
sought review in the Texas Supreme Court.
The Texas Supreme Court observed that, while partnership is a fiduciary
relat ionship and imposes upon partners duties of loyalty and utmost good faith,
"partners have no obligation to remain partners" torever.n o Partnership is at heart a
m id
21~/d.

~ /Johatch, 977 S. W .2d
111

at

5-t4-45.

~~ /J. at 545.
1

11~/d.
;~·'td.

12

:

' Bolwtch.977 S.W.2d at 545.

111

Bol!atch. 977 S. W.2d

at
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voluntary association.m This case presented an issue o f tirst impression in Texas;
that is, whether co-partners' fiduciary relationship "creates an exception to the atwill nature of partnerships .... "m More particularly, the court was asked whether
co-partners' fiduciary obligations give rise to a duty not to expel a partner who
reports a colleague's suspected overbilling.133
Butler & Binion's partnersh ip agreement neither specified nor limited the
grounds for expelling a partner. 234 There were no applicable Texas statutes. That
lett the court looking to the common law of partnership to resolve Bohatch 's
claims. 235
The Supreme Court of Texas observed that courts in other states had held that
partnerships could expel partners for business reasons, to protect relationships within
the partnership and with clients, and to resolve a schism within the firm.2J 6 "The
fiduc iary duty that partners owe one another does not encompass a duty to remain
partners or else answer in tor1 damages:·m Nonethe less, Bohatch and several legal
scholars supporting her as amicus curiae argued that public policy considerations
compelled the recognition of a limited duty to retain partners who blow the whistle
on co-partners' suspected misconduct.138 Such an extension of partners' fiduciary
duty was necessary, they argued, "because permitting a law firm to retaliate against a
partner who in good faith reports suspected overbi lling would discourage compliance
with ru les of professional conduct and thereby hurt clients."239 While recognizing
that this argument was forcefu l, the court rejected it, explaining:
A partnership exists solely because the partners choose to place personal
confidence and trust in one another. Just as a partner can be expelled,
without a breach of any common law duty, over disagreements about firm
policy or to resolve some other " fundamental schism," a partner can be
expelled f(>r accusing another partner of overbi lling without subjecting the
partnership to tort damages. Such charges, whether true or not, may have
a profound effect on the personal confidence and trust essential to the
partner relationship. Once such charges are made, partners may find it
impossible to continue to work together to their mutual benetit and the
benefit of their cl ients.140

:> 1/d. (citing Gelder Mcd. Group v. Webber. 363 N.E.2d 573,577 (N.Y. 1977)).

2.12/d
.
:.111£1.
234

/d at 546.

235

8ohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 546.

~3'!/d.
2411

Bohatch, 977 S. \V.2d. at 546-47 tcitation omitted).
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Two dissenting justices warned that the permission of "retaliation against a
partner who tries in good fa ith to correct or report perceived misconduct virtually
assures that others will not take these appropriate steps in the future( ,]" and that the
court' s approach would send ''an inappropriate signal . . . that the ntles of
professional responsibility are subordinate to a law fi rm's other interests." 241 The
majority was sensitive to this concern but reasoned that it was secondary to the
preservation of trust between partners. 142 Furthcrmore:
[T]he dissenting justices d[id] not explain how the trust relationship
necessary both for the firm's existence and for representing clients can
survive such serious accusations by one pa1iner against another. The
threat of tort liability for expulsion would tend to force partners to remain
in untenable circumstance-suspicious of and angry with each other-to
their own detriment and that of their clients whose matters are neglected
by lawyers distracted with intra-tim1 fridions. ~43
In a concurring opinion. Justice Hecht criticized the court tor fail ing to address
the dissenting justices' concern that upholding Bohatch ' s expulsion would
discourage lawyers from reporting unethical conduct. 244 He attempted to sidestep
this issue in his concurrence by focusing on the fact that Bohatch's concerns were
unfounded. He reasoned that her expulsion for reporting McDonald's perceived
overbilling could not be a breach of fiduciary duty because "a mistake so serious
indicates a lack of judgment warranting expulsion[,)" and it is indisputable that a
firm may expel a partner "for a serious error in judgment" in client or firm affairs. 245
As Justice Hecht analyzed matters, if Bohatch and McDonald had disagreed about
tactics in a case or Washington otTice operations, "the firm could have determined
that she should be expelled for the health of the fim1, even if [she] had acted in
complete good fa ith. Reporting unethical conduct where none existed is no
different." 246
The court's majority was unmoved by Justice Hecht's reasoning. His approach
did not encourage lawyers' compliance with ethics rules any more than the approach
the court adopted. Bohatch and amici argued simply that a reporting attorney must
act in good faith, not that she be right. "47 As the court saw it, their policy concerns
were best served by a clear demarcation of lawyers' ethical duties and partners' tort
24
li ability. ~ At the same time, the court held partners to their ethical duty to report
colleagues' misconduct.

24 1

/d. at 561 (Spector, .1., dissenting).

242

/d. at 547 (majority opinion).

"43/d.
2 14
' /d.
245

at 556 (Hecht. J., concurring).

Bohmch, 977 S.W.2d

at 555.

146/d.
247

/d. at 547.

14Rfd.
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We emphasize that our refusal to create an exception to the at-will nature
of partnerships in no way obviates the ethical duties of lawyers. Such
duties sometimes necessitate difficult decisions. . . . The fact that the
ethical duty to report may create an irreparable schism between partners
neither excuses failure to report nor transforms expulsion as a means of
resolving that schism into a tort.~~ 9
The court concluded that the firm ''did not owe Bohatch a duty not to expel her"
for reporting McDonald's alleged overbilling. 250 The court did agree. however, that
the firm had breached its partnership agreement by reducing Bohatch ·s tentative
1991 partnership distributions to zero; it therefore affirmed the court of appeals'
judgment. 251
As I recently explained in another article, Bohatch is a rotten decision from a
policy standpoint. 252 The opinion discourages partners from reporting colleagues'
serious ethical breaches. This is a policy error with consequences for c lients
because:
There are cases in which partners' misconduct, despite being serious, is so
subtle that it is likely to be discovered only by another lawyer in the same
firm. If another partner discovers the misconduct but fears retaliation if
she reports it, she has no incentive to make a report because there is a
strong possibility that the misconduct will never come to light otherwise.
Under Bohatch, the !'a ct that her report of her fellow partner's misconduct
would be made in good faith will not spare her expulsion. It is the client
who suffers in the end.~ 5 .l
The Bohatch court's approach is variously suspect. For example, in discounting
the dissent's concern that the decision would subordinate lawyers' professional
responsibilities, the court asserted that the dissent had not explained how the trust
necessary " for the firm's existence and for representing clients [could] survive such
serious accusations by one partner against another." 254 Furthermore, the threat of tort
liability for expulsion o n these facts would supposedly force partners to work
together bathed in anger and suspicion, with corresponding detrimental effects on
them and on their clients, whose matters the lawyers would neglect because of the
distractions caused by intra-firm frictions .255
There are at least six flaws in this reasoning. First, it should have been apparent
to the court that the fitm could survive Bohatch 's allegations about McDonald given
that Powers also reviewed McDonald's time records for overbilling and the firm did
not expel him. It is no answer to say that Powers did not join in complaining to firm

149/d.
~ 50 Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 547.
251 /d
152

Richmond, supra note 209. at 256.

253

/d. at257 (footnotes omitted).

2 54

Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 547.

255/d.
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management because his stealthy check of McDonald's honesty was just as likely to
foster distrust among other pa11ners. Second, firm leaders were perfectly poised to
suppress any anger or dispel any suspicion. All they needed to do was remind the
partnership that Bohatch was ethically bound to act as she did. 256 They could have
further explained to the other partners that had she failed to act, she might have
violated her duty of care to the law firm.257 Third, the other pa1tners could not afford
to let any anger or suspicion attributable to her behavior detract from clients'
representations because doing so would expose them to professional discipline for
violating their duties of competence and diligence.25 g and would open them to
potential malpractice liability. Fourth, if the firm was seriously fractured by
Bohatch 's allegations, the partners could have dissolved it and reformed with a more
harmonious makeup. Although dissolution is an unappealing option. it is preferable
to permitting a firm to expel a partner for honoring her ethical duties. Dissolution
certainly solves the problem of forcing partners to remain together in a hostile
environment. Fifth, if only a few partners at Butler & Binion were aggrieved by
Bohatch's actions, was it not more fair to require them to leave the tirm? Nothing
bound them to continued pa1tnership with Bohatch. In contrast, Bohatch reasonably
believed that her actions were compelled by ethics rules. Sixth, at-will employment
is also a voluntary association, yet the law commonly protects employees who, for
example, file workers' compensation claims or report public safety hazards to
officials. Employers cannot fire at-will employees who engage in legally protected
activities on the basis that their continued presence in the workplace would fuel
anger or suspicion. The court never articulated in any meaningful fashion how this
case was different.
In short, expelling a partner for good faith compliance with ethics rules is
materially different from expelling a partner for other behaviors potentially causing
friction within a law firm. The Texas Supreme Court should have held that Butler &
Binion's expulsion of Bohatch was an act of bad faith. Bohatch was wrongly
decided, and other courts should not tollow it.

C. Summary and Analysis
It is clear from the case law that courts will strictly enforce unambig uous
partnership agreements. Courts are undisturbed by the guillotine approach to pa11ner
expulsion.
Ever lurking, however, is the possibility that a firm's offered
justifications for a partner's ouster are pretextual and that the expulsion violated the
remaining partners' duty of good faith and fair dealing. So what does the duty of
good faith and fair dealing in this context require? Relatively little, it seems. Fim1s
may expel partners without fear of related liability where they have a legitimate
business purpose, as where a partner's conduct threatens a key business relationship,
is seriously disruptive within the firm, or somehow threatens to bring the firm into
256

See MODEL R ULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.l(a) (2008) (imposing on all partners in a
law firm a duty to see that "the firm has in efl'ect measures giving reasonable assurance that all
lawyers in the linn conform to the Rules or Professional Conducl'').
157
See WILLIAM A. GREGORY. THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSIIIP 292 (3d cd. 2001)
(discussing partners' duty of care to their partnerships).
258

See M ODEL R ULES OF
CONDUCT
PtWF'L
(mandating dili gence).
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disrepute. 259 The cases to date suggest that firms breach their duty of good faith and
fair dealing where a partnership agreement permits guillotine expulsion only if they
expel a partner for economically predatory purposes? >() or in reta liation for
exercising rights conferred by a partnership agreement. 2CII
Given the relative lack of case law. however. it is worthwhile asking how future
courts should analyze the duty of good faith and fair dealing in law partnership
expulsions. There seemingly are two principal options. The first is the ''excluder''
method articulated in the comments to section 404 of RUPA.~~>2 Under this approach.
the term "good faith and tair dealing" has no ''general meaning or meanings of its
own[,]" but instead operates "to rule out many different forms of bad faith. "263 In
other words, "good faith and fair dealing" means simply the absence of bad faith and
unfair dealing. The term ' s precise meaning will vary with case facts. 2<H The second
option is so-called "cost-of-contracting analysis."265 Cost-of-contracting analysis
asks whether discretion in performing the contract is exercised fo r a purpose
reasonably within the parties' contemplation or reasonable expectations. 2<>6 The
parties' expectations are determined from the contract language, or, if the contract is
unclear, from its purpose. 267 If the party vested with discretion exercises that
discretion to recapture its cost of contracting or to deprive the other party of the
benefit of her bargain, it breaches its duly of good faith and fair dealing. 168
Assume, for example, that a finn expels several partners for deticient
perfom1ance as objectively measured. whether tied to business development or
billable hours. The firm ' s partnership agreement provides for gui llotine severance.
Under the excluder approach , these expu lsions would not violate the duty of good
fai th and fair dealing. They were motivated not by the remaining partners ' desire to
seize money or property due the ousted partners, or to otherwise take advantage of
them. Nor would these expulsions be in bad faith under the cost-of-contracting
approach. The firm did not expel the partners to recoup the cost of their original
agreement, i.e., the foregone opportunity to keep all finn profits to themse l ves. ~c··'

1 9

See. e.g., Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Surro. 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336. 346-50 (Ct. App.

$

1996).
1wSee

Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 442-43 (Ind. C t. App. I 990);
Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515.523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
261

Winston & Strawn v. Nosal. 664 N.E.2d 239, 244 (I ll. App. Ct. 1996).

262Roi3ER'I

W. HILLMAN F. r AL. . Til E R liVIS
DIFORM
F. UNPARTN ERSHIP A CT

~ 404 cmt. 4

(2007).

~1>4/d.
265

Dalley, supra note II. at 199.

266 /d.

(citing Sn::veN J. B u RTON & ERIC' G. A NDERSON
FAITH
TRACTUAL
.
CoN G o
at 54 ( 1995)).
267

26
2

oo

3.4. 1,

/d. at 199-200.

x/d. at 200.

M

See id. at 200-02 (explaining cost-of-contracting analysis).
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The ousted partners <.:ould not have reasonably e.xpected to remain partners
indefinitely if they did not t.:ontribute to the firm's protitability.
Now let's change the facts. In this scenario, a law firm expels a number of
pnrtners f(>r the purpose of increasing its overall profitability. The remaining
partners will see their protits increase as a result of the expu l sions~ indeed, that is
their goal. The partners who arc expel led perhaps do not work as hard or produce as
much business as those who remain, but they are not disruptive and they are by no
means shirk in!!. The outcome in this scenario is much more difficult to predict. The
ickersham H-'
& Tafr 711 suggests that the llrm
decision in B;as/ey v. Cac!lmlader,
could very wel l be found gui lty of bad faith under excluder analysis. 27 1 The tact that
the tirm is not as profitable as some partners apparently prefer does not mean they
are permitted to throw their matt:s overboard. "While life in the market pla<.:e may
well be made up of fear, greed and money, life in a partnership is not so
composed.''m If a firm must endure declining profits in the spirit of partnership, as
Beasley arguably indicates. then a tirm cannot in good faith expel partners when it is
operating profitably, even if not ideally or optimall
y
so.
The firm might also lose this case under a cost-of-contracting analysis because
the remaining patiners' actions are motivated by personal financ ial gain.m The
remaining partners "are seeking to avoid a cost of their original agreement-the
toregone opportunity to keep all the [ firm 's] profit[s] for themselves." 2' 4 Nor did the
expelled partners reasonably expect that the firm would become so successfu l that
their colleagues would squeeze them out in order to hoard all the protits. 275 These
expulsions are not for the good or the firm, which would legitimize them176 ; they are
for the good of select members oft he firm and knowingly detrimental to others.
On the other hand, the firm would understandably contend that its pat1nership
status does not change the fact that it is a profit-making enterprise and all partners
know that when they are admitted to the partnership. Lawyers understand the
marketplace. The tact that the expelled partners were not shirking and were good
firm citizens does not mean that they were perfonning up to expectations. Moreover,
the pursuit of increased profits is normal business act ivity. The fi nn must do
whatever is nccessa1y to retain the highest-pert·onning partners if it is to succeed in a
competitive environment, which clearly is good for the firm and partnership as a
whole, and maximizing profits per equity partner is a prudent strategy for
accomplishing that goal. The partners who were expelled could never have
170

No. CL-94-R646" AJ"', 1996 WL 43ll777 (Fla. C ir. Ct. July 23, 1996), aj('d in pan,
part. 728 So. 2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).

re1 • "din

271 !d.

at *7.

~1~Id.

n,lSee Dalley, s upra note II , at120
(stating that und.:r
the cost-ol~contractin g approach,
lsion
"expu
for the personal financia l gain o f the remaining partners will be a breach of the
covenant of good faith").

m id.
275

/d. at 202.

21

<'See id. at 20 I (stating that "expulsion[s] in the hest interests of the partnership" do not
violate the duty of good faith and tair dea ling)
(ilnt
erna quotation marks omitted)).
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reasonably expected anything else. That is especially true given that the parrneri;hip
agreement provides for g uillotine expulsion.
Which side has the better argument here? That probably is a matter o r
perspective. The outcome under either the excluder or cost-of-contracting approach
will likely depend on additional facts revealed in discovery. It is also possible that
some of the expulsions will tum out to be lawfu l and others not.
Finally, with respect to economic self-interest, consider a case in which a senior
partner is a major rainmaker at her finn. Over the years, she has institutionalized her
clients by involving younger partners and associates in all aspects of their
representations and by allowing them to interact directly with the clients' sen ior
management. The other partners would like to redistribute the senior partner's
generous compensation among others in the firm. O n the theory that the firm wi ll
lose no clients if the senior partner leaves because other pat1ners who are t~uniliar to
the clients from the ir representations will be able to retain the business, the tirm
expels the senior partner pursuant to the guillotine expulsion provis ion in the
partnership agreement.
The senior partner 's expulsion p lainly violates the remaining partners' duty of
good faith and fair dealing under the excluder approach. The firm expelled her for a
predatory purpose. There was no suggestion that the senior par1ner was underperforming in any fashion; her colleagues simply coveted her share of the firm's
protits. The expulsion also constitutes bad faith under cost-of-contracting ana lysis.
The remaining partners are seeking to avoid a cost of their orig inal agreement by
keeping the senior partner's share of the finn's profits for themselves or for
distribution to favored colleagues. The senior partner could not have reasonably
expected that the firm would expel her for doing what all finns want all partners to
do--develop new business and institutionalize the clients they attract so that those
clients remain loyal to the firm even if the partner leaves. retires, or becomes
disabled.
It is possible to conceive of other expulsions that would fail both the exc luder
and cost-of-contracting analyses. For example, expelling a partner lor exercising
rights granted by the finn's partnership agreement is clearly an act of bad faith under
either approach.277 Expelling a partner for honoring her obligations under rules of
professional conduct should constitute bad faith no matter how a nalyzcd Y~ A firm
would also breach its duty of good faith and fair dealing no matter how analyzed if it
expelled a partner as a result of another partner's personal vendetta. or because the
target partner simply upsets or is disliked by more influential or powerful part ners.
IV. CURRENT I SSUES

This Part examines two current issues. First, is the involuntary dc-equitization of
a partner a de facto expulsion of that partner'? Second. if a firm vests all decision-

271See.

e.g., Winston & Strawn v. Nosal. 664 N.E.2d 239. 243-46 ( Ill. App. Ct. 1996)
(expelling partner who sought access to the lirm ·s books and records).
~18See Dalley, supra note I I. at 202 (asserting that such an expulsion should fail the costof-contracting test). Bllf see Bohatch v. Butler & Binion. 977 S.W.3d 543.545-47 (Tex. l99ii)
(finding that finn did not breach fiduciary duty when it expelled partner who reported
colleague's possible fraudulent billing).
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making authority in a sing le partner, including decisions concerning partner
expulsion, does that in any fashion affect the du ty of good taith and fair dealing?

A. De-Equitization and Erpulsion
In the past several years, many of the nation 's largest law fi rms have become
two-tier or multi-tier partnershi ps, with both equity and non-equ ity partners.m (This
Part wi ll refer only to two-tier partnerships for simplicity's sake.) Two-tier
partnerships allow law fi rms to state higher profits per partner, w hich are calculated
solely on the basis of equ ity partners. 280 In theory, the higher a law firm's profits per
partner, the greater its prestige and the greater its abil ity to attract superior legal
talent. 281 The reasons for the rise of two-tier partnerships are perhaps best
summarized as follows:
In general, law fi rm consultants and managing pariners . . . readily
concede that the movement toward two-tier partnershi ps has been driven
by economic factors. The perceived benefits of this structure fa ll roughly
into four categories: ( I) improved client service th rough lower lawyer
attrition; (2) an elongated evaluation period that red uces errors in
promotion to equ ity partner; (3) alignment of voting power with economic
contributio n, which reduces the likelihood of rainmaker defections; and
(4) favorable market dynamics spawned by higher profits per partner.
such as easier recrui tment of latera l associates and partners and the ability
to attract higher caliber law firms for potential mergers. 1~ 2
For the most part, young lawyers ascending in law firms tend to placidly accept
two-tier partnership, regardless of whether they expect to pass th rough a non-equity
tier on their way to equity status or whether they anticipate remaining a non-equity
partner indetinitely. For them, two-tier partnershi ps are a simple reality of modern
law fi nn li fe. But non-equity partnership can also be employed as "a management
tool to pru ne the partnership of unproductive equity (partners]."2x3 During economic
downturns, as well as duri ng periods of flat profits or minimal g rowth. pressu re
builds within two-tier firms to demote equity partners who are perceived to be underperforming to non-equity status. ~~ 4 The process of demoting equity partners to nonequity status is referred to as "de-equitization."
For equ ity partners who are involuntarily de-equitized by their firms, the
process-no matter how discreetly accomplished- is often embarrassing and

27

~William D. Henderson, An Empirical Sfl"~'" of Single-Tier Versus TII"O· Tier
Partnerships in the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1691. 1694-95 (2006).
ts pro
230

fi
A finn's
of equity partners.

per partner are calculated by dividing the finn· s profits by the number

~~~Hende rson, wpra note 279, at 1694-95.
~~ 2 1d. at 1711-12 ( footnott:s omilled).

28.1/J. at 1710.
~s~See id. (noting lhis phenomenon during economic downturns).
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stigmatizing. ~x~ Being de-equitized is ..almost like getting fired[.]'~"· II certainly is a

bitter pill to swallow. But is de-equitization the equivalent of getting tired'!~~, More
accurately, is involuntarily de-equit iLing a partner the same as expelling her'?
There is some reason to think that involuntary de-cquitization is de facto
expulsion. "A partner without an equity interest ic; obviously a contradiction in
terms." 2 ~8 Advocates for de-equitiLcd partners might argue that law partnership is by
definition an association of two or more individuals or professional corporations
fom1ed to practice law for prolit. 2~'' and that dclinition docs not accommodate
lawyers who do not share in their firms· prolits. Moreover, unlike equity pa11ners.
non-equity partners have little say in their lirms· direction or management. Nonequity partners often do not pa11icipate in tirm votes.~·~• Judging by their scrutiny of
billing rates. some sophisticated clients perceive non-equity partners as being
fundamentally different from equity partncrs.:•n Last. because of indemnitication
provisions commonly found in two-tier firm s' partnership agreements, non-equity
partners are not personally liable for their lirms' debts, and personal liability for the
debts of one's firm is a distinguishing feature of partnership.~··~ Thus. de-equitizing a
partner is the same as expelling her.
The foregoing analysis. while superficially appealing. is overly simplistic. First.
the fact that non-equity parrnership is a contradiction in terms means only that
partnership law has some catching up to do in the Ia'' firm realm. ~'1· It does not
mean that a partner forced into non-equity status was expelled from hc.:r firm.
Second, the definition of a partnership offered above.: does not require that all
partners share in a finn's profits: it requires only that the firm be formed for the
1

m see JeiT Blumenthal. On theeicinc
Di.
ul\ tmte{
,
\l cl
ol De- J:'qniti::ati
on.
L EG1\ L
/ sp
Dec. 3. 2002, at I al·ailah/e ut http://www .law .com,j
articlc.jsp?id=l03&966824697 (quoting kgal consultant Jot!l R o~c).
INTELLICiE:-!CER.

~ /d. (quoting legal consultant Joel Rose).

2 6

2 7

s An equity partner might voluntarily move to non-equity :.tatus because he prd'i:rs the
reduced demands of non-equity status or because he i$ winding down his career. An equity
partner might desire non-equity status bcl~ause she no longer wants to invcsl capital in her
firm, or because she favors the guaranteed income that non-equity status provid~::s. Obviously.
an equity partner's voluntary decision to move 10 non-equity status cannot bl.! equated with
expulsion.
~8 xl-lil lman , supra note 12. at 397.
2x9See GREGORY. supra note 257, at 263 (ddining a partnership 1:~ ls ..an a~sociation of two
or more individuals. partnerships. corporaiivns. or associations tormcd to carry on a trade.
occupation. or profession for profit.. ).
290 Biumenthal, supra

note 285. at I (quoting kgals con ultanl Joel Ro:,c).

See Tamara Loomis, Parmer
st Ren
Statu.,
Firms
•al IsPartner
a Billing ls~ ue:
Mu
to Dupom when Asking f i.w Fe'' Hike. 27 N,\l 't L.J .. at &, 8-9 (2005) (discussing

29 1

DuPont 's analysis and c\aluation of billing nuc~ bo::t\\CI.!n equit) and non-equity panncrs).
292

EEOC v. Sidley Austin Rmwn & Wood. 315 F.3d 696.703 (7th Cir. 2002).

1

2'1 See Hillman, supra note 1:!. at 397 (.. The de,clopmcnt of different lc\cls of partner
status within a (law] finn is one example of ho" the mmlem Ia'' firm hal> outgro\\ n thc Ia\\ of
partnerships.'').
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purpose of making a profit.~'l 4 Anyway, most non-equity partners are compensated
by way of guaranteed payments out of firm profits. Third. de-equitized partners
remain partners to the outside world.~q5 A de-equitized partner's business card still
identifies her as a partner. Most law ti1m websites do not distinguish between equity
and non-equity partners. Fourth, many law tirms afford non-equity partners some
voting rights. Some fi1ms allow non-equity partners to vote on select issues, while
others allow non-equity partners to vote on all matters on which equity partners vote.
Under the centralized
Even if they did not, that is often inconsequential.
management model now common among large law firms, equity partners vote on
relatively few issues. 29~ Fifth, many law firms are now organized as limited liability
partnerships, or LLPs, so the fact that non-equity partners are not personally
responsible for finn debts is rarely a distinguishing fcature ?Q 7 Besides. the fact that
non-equity partners are indemnified against personal liability does not mean that they
do not have it, but rather that the equity partners in the finn will indemnify them if
able.
Finally, de-equitized partners keep their oflices, remain among their
colleagues, serve the same clients. and continue to be compensated for their work. In
some cases, de-equitized partners' compensation does not materially decrease.
In short, it is difficult to conclude that de-equitizing a partner is generally akin to
expelling her. There is authority, however, that might support a different result.
In Davis v. Loftus/ 98 the plaintiffs sued Michael Loftus, David Engel, and the
partners in the law finn of Gottlieb & Schwartz for Loftus' and Engel's alleged
malpractice in a real estate transaction. One of the partners named as a defendant,
Anthony Frink, moved for summary judgment on the basis that he did not qualify as
a Gottlieb & Schwartz partner for vicarious liability purposes.!'!') Frink was an
"income partner.".IOfl According to the firm's partnership agreement, income partners
received a fixed level of compensation set annually by the executive committee, plus
a bonus. The partnership agreement expressly provided that income partners would
not share in the firm's profits or losses. Each income partner made a $1 0,000 capital
contribution to the tinn to be repaid upon withdrawal or dissolution, without any

2 4

q But see Community Capital Bank v. Fisher and Yanowtiz, 850 N.Y.S.2d 508. 510 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2008) (requiring protit sharing for partnership).

295

Loomis, supra note 29 I. at 9 (according to law firm consultant William Johnston,
"[w]ho is and isn't an equity partner . .. is not something that is widely publicized external ly
[or] internally" (second alteration in original)).
296
See Sidley. 3 15 F.3d at 699 (oftering an extreme example of a law finn in which equity
partners do not vote on most firm issues).

m See generally LARRY E. Rlll~TEIN & PETER V. LETSOL, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS § 6.05,
at 239 (4th ed. 2003) ("All LLP statutes provide that LLP partners are not personally liable for
the negligence or other misconducl of other partners or employees unless the partner
participated in or supervised the wrongdoing.. .. Most recently enacted LLP statutes limit the
liability of LLP partners for both <.:ontracHypc and tort-type liabilities.").
~9~778 N.E.2d 1144 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
1

''~'~Set: id. a1 1148 (incorrectly charac1aLdng the motion as a motion to dismiss).

100/d.
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adjustment for firm growth or prolits in the time since it was made. Income partners
had no voting rights and were not eligible to sit on the executive committee 3 01
Several other income partners moved to join in Frink's motion. The trial court
joined all of the income panners for consideration of Frink's motion. 302 The trial
court granted the motion. holding that the "income partners did not qualify as
partners. and therefore they did not share liability tor the acts of [the fim1 's other]
partners [or] employees .. . ."·' 113 The plaintifts immediately appealed.
The COlllt in Davis first noted that ''[t]he substance and not the torm of a business
relationship determines whether the relationship qualities as a partnership."304 Here.
the income partners received a tixcd salary plus bonus and did not share in the firm's
protits or losses; while they made capital contributions to the firm, the firm would
repay those contributions in full upon the income partners' withdrawal from the finn
or the fim1's dissolution. regardless of the firm ' s profit or loss tollowing the
contribution; the tirm's executive committee set income partners' compensation; and
the income partners had no right to vote on the management of the fi rm or the
conduct of its business:w5 The income partners at Gottlieb & Schwartz lacked "the
essential characteristics of 'partners'" under the Illinois Partnership Act. 306 The court
therefore found that they were not partners within the meaning of the Act and that
they could not be held liable for Loftus· and Engel"s alleged malpractice. 307
Because Frink had presented the trial court with admissible evidence of his
income partner status, the court affirmed summary judgment for him. The court also
aftinned summary judgment for two other defendants identified as income partners
in the partnership agreement that Frink submitted as an exhibit to his motion. The
other income partners who had not been similarly identified saw their summary
judgments reversed:'"K The Dads court remanded their cases to the trial court for the
presentation of evidence concerning their partnership status. 30'1
Davis indicates that. on the right facts, a court might not consider non-equity
partners to be pattners. If so, a firm's de-equitization of a partner is necessarily an
expulsion. It is no help to distinguish Daris on the basis that it was not an expulsion
case because it is not persuasive to argue that a lawyer can be a partner for some
purposes but not others. Partncrship is not a hat that a lawyer can take otf and put on
depending on the advantage to be gained or detriment to be <~voided thereby.
In the end, it may not matter whether the involuntarily de-equitization of a
pattncr is a de lltcto expulsion . This is because partners owe one another a duty of

!01/d.
302ld.
303

Davis v. Loftus, 77X N.c.2u

ll-1·1. 1146 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).

.l<I-'Id.atll5l.
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good ti1ith and fair dealing "in all matters relating to the partnership business." 3 10
13ecause the duty of good taith and fair dealing is always in effect among and
between partners in their roles as such. it must apply to de-equitizations just as it
docs expulsions. The decision to de-equitize a partner, if made in bad faith. is
therefore actionable. Good faith and fair dealing in the de-equitization context can
be evaluated under either of the methods used to evaluate the duty in relation to
expulsions. Obviously, in the;: odd event that a firm 's pm1nership agreement does not
allow for de-equitization, a partner who is de-equitized may sue for breach of
contract.
B. Good Faith and the Sole Decision-Maker

A tew law tinns grant their managing partners or chairpersons sole discretion to
expel partners. 311 Such arrangements are rare, 311 but they do exist.
J 13
Although there appear to be no reported cases on-point, it seems almost certain
that vesting sole discretion in a managing partner or chairperson has the potential to
complicate some expulsion matters. Managing partners are said to owe their copartners "especially stringent" fiduciary duties equivalent to those owed by trustees
to bencticiaries.m Or, as the court in Welder v. Green·11 ' phrased it, "[m]anaging
partners owe their partners the highest fiduciary duty recognized in the law."316 No
matter how that exceedingly high duty is described or measured, it is surely true that
it confers an advantage on ousted partners challenging their expulsions.
An expu lsion ordered by a sole decision-maker is especially vulnerable to
challenge where it is based not on the partner's alleged under-performance but on
non-economic fac tors such as an alleged loss of trust in the expelled partner, the
claimed existence of a schism in the tirm attributable to the expelled partner's
conduct. the alleged impairment ot· the tirm's reputation as a result of the ousted
partner's activities. and so on. In each of these instances the target partner is
positioned to argue that the reason given lor her expulsion is pretextual, that the
decision was part of a personal vendeua, and that the managing partner is acting in
bad faith. Although such allegations can be made in many cases, expulsions by
committee or partnership vote are not judged by the elevated fiduciary standard

·""Winston & Strawn v. Nosal. 66-1 N. l-:.2d 239. 244-45 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). Accord
Bellino"· McGmth Nonh Mullin & Kratz. PC LLO. 738 N.W.2d i134. 446 (Neb. 2007); Yon
Sternberg v. Caffee. 692 N.W.2d 549. 554 (S.D. 2005); M~)ore v. Moore. 599 S.E.2d 467,
472-73 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004).

"'Nate Raymo nd. 'l11e Terminator: :\4art Kasou·it:: I!a:; a Ve1:1· Special Power, AM. LAW.,
Jul y 200~, at 33.
'12/d.
"~See general~r Nate Raymom.l
.
runner Partner 's Lm1·.mi1 Against Kasvwitz Benson
Prompts One-Man
Talk 1d
Firing Machines, AM. LAw .. Junl! 10. 2008. available at
hup://www.law ...:om/jsp
/articlcaniclc.jsp?id= 1202422064SR7
(discussing several firms'
expulsion prat.:~iccs).
11

. Riddlc v. Simmons. 922 So. 2d 1267, 1282 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 170

'~~9S5 S. \.V.2d

(Tex. App. I tJ98).

'lf'ld. at 175.
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applied to managing partners. In addition, expulsion by committee or partnership
vote tends to inject objectivity into the process. Vesting discretion in an executive or
management committee, or requiring a partnership vote to expel, may prevent
potentially damaging misjudgments by a sole dec ision-maker. That is tme regardless
of the reasons offered for expulsion.
V. THE EMPLOYMENT LAW 0VERPLA Y

Our discussion so far has logica lly focused on partnership law. But many large
and mid-sized law tirms have embraced centralized management, with most
decisions about firm affai rs entrusted to executiw or management committees.m
Many decisions on wh ich partners used to vote are now delegated to law firms'
elected leadership. Whi le managerial consolidation has many benefits for law firms,
with those benefits comes the possibility that firms' personnel decisions involving
partners are subject to federal anti-discrimination laws. This is because antidiscrimination statutes. such as Title VII of the Civi l Rights Act of 1964 ("Tile
VII''), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA''), and the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("'ADA"), protect "employees" against unlawfu l
discriminat ion, 31 ~ and partners in tirms with centralized management may appear to
be more like employees than partners. As a general rule, partners are considered to
be employers, not employees, and thus are not protected under anti-discrimination
laws:119 Courts have typica lly been reluctant to extend anti-discrimination statutes
"to the management of a law firm by its partners'' given that "[t]he relationship
among law partners" has been thought to "(differ] marked ly" from employeremployee relationships:'"0 Th is difference is manifested in ''the common conduct of
a shared enterprise[.r which is ''the essence of [a] law partnership."m
The effect of centralized management in professional partnerships is not lost on
courts. 122 It is now fo reseeable that partners in professional partnerships may be able
to successfully challenge their demotion. discharge, or expulsion on the basis that
those actions are discrirninatory.m To prevail, a pm1ner of course must show that
she is an employee rather than an employer. ~~ This can be a complex inqui1y that is
1

Rachel M. M ila:.:.zo. Note. Circular De.ftnilions
ll'hal <~/
Cunstitwes an Emplovee.
De1ermining Whether 1he Part11ers <~(Sidley Auslin Brown & Wood Quali[v as Employers or
Employees Under Federal Law. 51 Sr . LOUIS U. L.J. 1329. 1353 (2007) (noting this tendency
117See

with respect to the "majority oflargcr llaw] firms").
31

s/d. at 1329-30.

31''Simpson

v. Ernst & You ng, I00 F.Jd 436. -143 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing ADEA and
ERISA as appl ied to a profi::ssional partnership).
-' 20 Hishon
-'"

v. King & Spalding. 467 U.S. 69.79 (1984) (Powell.

J.. concurring).

1

/d. at 79.

m see. e.g., Simpson. 100 F.3d at 441-42 (discussing. activities and responsibilit
i
t:s or
accounting firm 's management committ~c) .
21
-' · See. e.g., id. at 440-44 (anim1ing judgmt:nt lor accountant against firm on age
discrimination and rdaliation ~:!aims under ADEA and ER ISA).
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not easily or expediently resolvcd. 3 ~ 5 As things now stand, six factors are relevant to
this inquiry: (I) whether the firm can hire or fire the lawyer or set the rules and
regulations governing her work; (2) whether and, if so, to what extent, the firm
supervises the lawyer's work; (3) whether the lawyer reports to someone higher in
the tirm; (4) whether and. if so. to what extent, the lawyer is able to influence the
firm; (5) whether the parties intended the lawyer to be an employee as expressed in
wri tten agreements or contracts; and (6) whether the lawyer shares in the profits,
losses. and li abilities. 3 ~" These factors are not exhaustive,327 and no one of them is
decisi ve. 3:"'
The possible application of anti-discrimination laws to law firm de-equitizations
and expulsions has become a critical issue for all concerned as a result of the Seventh
Circuit's decision in EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood. 329 In 1999, Sidley &
Austin. as the tinn was then known. demoted thirty-two equity partners to "counsel"
or "senior counsel" status.JJO None of the demoted partners filed a charge of
discrimination against the firm. 331 The EEOC, however, launched an investigation to
determine whether the tirm ·s actions violated the ADEA. 332 The EEOC subpoenaed
a variety of information from the firm to evaluate the ADEA's application and the
existence of discrimination. For there to be an ADEA violation, "the [EEOC] would
have to show that the 32 partners were [in fact) employees before their
dcmotion(s]." ' 33 Sidley resisted the subpoena in part. so the EEOC applied to the
district court tor an order enforcing it in full. The district court ordered the firm to
comply fully , and Sidley immediately appealed.m
The firm contended that the EEOC had no jurisdiction to investigate the
demotions "because a partner is an employer within the meaning of the federal antidiscrimination laws if (a) h[er] income included a share of the firm's profits(;) (b)
(sjhe [contributed) capital [to) the firm[;] (c) [s]he [wa]s liable for the firm's debts[;]
and (d) (s]he ha[s] some administrative or managerial (duties] .... " 335 The court's

msee. e.g., Panepucci v. Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn LLP, No. 05-2579, 2008
WL 2467979. at *3 (6th Cir. June 18, 2008) (noting that district court had denied law firm's
motion to dismiss because it was unable to determine whether female partner alleging
discriminution was an employl!e within the meaning of various federa l laws).
· ~See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells. 538 U.S. 440, 449-50 (2003)
(identifying the six factors which indicate whether a shareholder-director is an employee
(quoting the EEOC Compliance Manual § 605:0009)).
12

m id. at450 n. l 0.
3

~"/d. at 45 I .
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3
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locus, however. quickly shifted to the firm's highly centralized management
structure. The record revealt:d the following:
The tim1 [wa]s controlled by a self-perpetuating executive committee.
Partners who [were] not memhcrs of tho.! committee ha[d] some powers
delegated to them by it with respect to the hiring. firing, promotion and
compensation of their subordinates, but so far as their own status [wa]s
concerned they [were] at the committee's mercy. It c[ould] fire them,
promote them. demote them (as it did to the 32), raise their pay. lower
their pay. and so forth. The only firm-widl.' issue on which [the] partners
hald] voted in the last quarter century was the merger with Brown &
Wood .... Each ofth<! 32 partners at the time of their demotion ... had a
capital account with the tirm. averaging about $400.000 ... . [E]ach was
liable for the firm's liabilities in proportion 10 his capital . . . . Their
income, however, was determined by the number of percentage points of
the lirm 's overall profits that the executive committee assigned to each of
them. Each served on one or more of the firm 's committees, but all these
committees [were] subject to control by the executive committee.136
Sidley had satisfied Illinois law insofar as forming and maintaining a partnership
went and the thirty-two demoted partners were partners for state law purposes.337
The EEOC contended, however, that even if the demoted lawyers were partners
under state law, that did not determine their status under federal anti-discrimination
laws. m The question was whether Sidley partners were employers under the A DEA.
The court was not satisfied that Sidley. by proving that the demoted lawyers were
partners, had established that they were employers.m As the court explained in
comparing the firm to a corporation:
This case .. . involves a partnership or more than 500 partners in which
all power resides in a small, unelected committee (it has 36 members).
The partnership does not elect the members of the executive committee;
the committee elects them. like the self-perpetuating board of trustees of a
private university or other charitable foundation. It is true that the
partners can commit the firm. for example by writing opinion letters; but
employees of a corporation, when acting within the scope of their
employment , regularly commit the corporation to L'Ontractual
undertakings, not to mention ... tort liability . Partners who are not
members of the executive committee share in the pr0fits of the fim1; but
many corporations ba!>e their employees· compensation in part ... on the
corporation's protits. \Vithout . . . supposing them employers. The
participation of the 32 demoted partners in committees that have ...
merely administrative functions docs not distinguish them from executive
employees in corporations. Corporations have committees and the

J)~Jd
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members of the committees are employees; this does not make them
employers. Nor are the members of the committees on which the 32
[serve] elected; they are appointed by the executive committee. The 32
owned some of the firm's capital, but executive-level employees often
own stock in their corporations.340
The "most pa1ineresque feature" of the demoted partners' relation to the firm was
their personal liability for the firm's debts, because unlimited liabi lity '"is the most
salient ... difference between the standard partnership and a corporation."34 1 But
this !actor was not sufficient to outweigh the other considerations. The fact that the
thirty-two demoted partners were in tact partners did not determine whether they
were employers, and their personal liability was germane only to the former. 342 It
was possible that the two classes at issue- pa11ners under state law and employers
under federa l law--did not overlap.w
Ultimately, the court concluded that the ADEA ' s potential application remained
murky despite Sid ley's partial compliance with the subpoena and that the EEOC was
entitled to full compliance with the subpoena insofar as coverage was concerned.344
The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court with directions. 1 ~ 5
Sidle_1· ended with a bang, but not in the sense that a court final ly determined
whether the thirty-two demoted partners were actually entitled to protection under
the ADEA. Rather, the case settled for $27.5 million. 346 Pursuant to the per capita
distributions negotiated as part of the settlement, which were among the richest ever
achieved by the EEOC, U1e payments to the thirty-two demoted partners averaged
$859,375, with a high of $1,835,510 and a low of $122, 169.'~ 7 Under the consent
decree entered into as pa1i of the settlement, Sidley also admitted that it treated the
thirty-two demoted partners as employees.3 4s The firm did not admit that it violated
the ADEA in demoting the partners. 349
There can be no doubt that Sidley is an important case. The decision brightly
signals the potential importance of federa l, state and local employment law in deequitization and expulsion matters. When lirms consider adverse actions against

3 0

~ /d. at 702-03.

1

~ 1 /d. at 703.

14
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'~ Sidley. 315 F.3d at 707.
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partners, they now must consider the potential application of anti-discrimination laws
to their decisions, in addition to the propriety of their actions under partnership
law.' 5'' That said, it is critically important to observe that the court in Sidley did not
rule that the demoted partners were employees under the ADEA; indeed, the court
disclaimed such a ruling on the basis that it would be premature given the posture of
the case. 151 Sidley' s admission in settling that the demoted partners were employees
for ADEA purposes is in·elevant to other controversies.
Furthermore, Sidlev is distinguished by the extraordinary fashion in which the
finn centralized its management. Most firms' executive committees are not selfperpetuating. Many firms have separate nominating committees that propose
candidates for e lection to the executive or management committee, and then the firm
elects one or more candidates from that slate. Nominating committee members are
themselves elected by the partnership. Many finns have compensation committees
that determine partners' compensation either independent of the executive or
management committee or with only minimal involvement or oversight by the latter
committee. Again, the partners elect the compensation committee members. Many
law firms limit their management's ability to demote or expel partners. In most
tirms, apparently unlike Sidley. partners vote on the election of lawyers to
partnership, rather than delegating that responsibility to the executive or management
committee. In the twenty-five years leading up to the Seventh Circuit's decision, the
Sidley partnership had voted on a s ingle firm-wide issue. Few, if any, other law
firms could make such a claim even if they wanted to. The list of ways in which
another firm with centralized management might be distinguished from Sidley is
long, and every one of those distinctions likely reduces the chance of antidiscrimination laws applying to de-equitization and expulsion decisions.
Finally, Sidley does not support the proposition that law firms may not deequirize or expel partners without fouling anti-discrimination laws. Rather, the
decision suggests that in some circumstances, employment law and partnership law
may intcract.m
VI. CONCLUSION

Law tirm partners may be de-equitized or expelled by their firms in good times
as well as lean. Such actions appear to be on the upswing. There are, however,
relatively few cases on these subjects. The leading case, Holman v. Coie, 153 is dated;
the practice or law' at least in large law tinns, has changed considerably in the thirty
plus years since Holman was decided. Looking ahead, courts must carefully
reanalyze the intra-tinn duty of good faith and fair dealing. Rather than confining
liability to cases of economic predation, courts should review partner de-

5

hSee. e.g .. Pancpucci v. Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn LLP, No. 05-2579, 2008
WL 2467979 (6th Cir. June I!!. 2008) (detai ling discrimination claims by female equity
partner against law llrm and ultimately affirming district ~:ourt ' s detennination that such
claims were subject to arbitration c lause in finn's partnership agreement).
-'

35 1

EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood. 315 F.3d 696. 707 (7th Cir. 2002).

352 See,

e.g., Panepucci. 2008 WL 2467979. at **2-6 (d iscussing effect of arbitration
provision in pa11nership agreement on lemale equity partner's discrimination c laims).
J>.\522 P.2d 5 15 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
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equitizations and expulsions under either excluder or cost-of-contracting analysis.
The fact that de-equitization and expulsion are not equivalents does not exempt the
former from judicial scrutiny because partners' duty of good faith and fair dealing
attaches to all matters relating to partnership business.
From firms' perspective, they must ensure that their de-equitization and
expulsion decisions pass muster under both partnership and potentially antidiscrimination law. T he discretion granted them by guillotine expulsion provisions
in their partnership agreements. while generally allowing them to expel partners who
are shirking or seriously d isruptive, is not boundless, nor should it be.
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